Dangers in Prescription Drugs: Filling a Private Law Gap in the Healthcare Debate by Owen, David G.
University of Connecticut 
OpenCommons@UConn 
Connecticut Law Review School of Law 
2010 
Dangers in Prescription Drugs: Filling a Private Law Gap in the 
Healthcare Debate 
David G. Owen 
Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review 
Recommended Citation 
Owen, David G., "Dangers in Prescription Drugs: Filling a Private Law Gap in the Healthcare Debate" 
(2010). Connecticut Law Review. 57. 
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/57 
 733 
CONNECTICUT 
LAW REVIEW 
 
VOLUME 42 FEBRUARY 2010 NUMBER 3 
 
Article 
Dangers in Prescription Drugs: 
Filling a Private Law Gap in the Healthcare Debate  
DAVID G. OWEN 
 
The healthcare debate raging in this nation largely ignores the role of 
private law in healthcare reform.  One aspect of private law occasionally 
included in the discussion is how medical malpractice litigation may raise 
healthcare costs, by increasing the cost of liability insurance for medical 
providers and encouraging them to practice “defensive medicine.” Yet, 
another aspect of private law affecting health care in America remains 
outside the current debate—the responsibility of makers and sellers of 
prescription drugs for harm caused by the dangers such drugs contain. 
Closing this gap in the healthcare debate, this Article proposes that the 
law ban design defect litigation against manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, 
and, further, that it abolish the “learned intermediary doctrine,” thereby 
imposing full-bodied duties on both manufacturers and pharmacists to 
warn consumers.  These changes should promote the central goals of 
healthcare reform—maximizing consumer choice, increasing quality, and 
reducing costs of health care in America.  While these proposals are bold, 
the current healthcare crisis demands bold solutions.  Together, these 
reforms should motivate drug companies, pharmacists, and patients to 
partner together to reduce the harmful effects of unavoidable dangers in 
prescription drugs while exploiting the many benefits of pharmaceuticals 
for human health. 
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Dangers in Prescription Drugs: 
Filling a Private Law Gap in the Healthcare Debate 
DAVID G. OWEN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
How America should reform its healthcare system is one of the most 
unsettled and contentious political issues in the nation today.  Swirling 
within the debate are questions of how to cover millions of uninsured; how 
to maximize patient choice of physicians and treatments; how to improve 
the quality of care; how broadly to restructure the health delivery system; 
and how to limit the costs of, and fund, whatever newly constructed 
healthcare system emerges from the present debate.  No matter how a 
person may view the myriad issues in this great American dialogue, one 
which surely will continue for years to come, observers generally agree 
that central objectives of any plan should include maximizing consumer 
choice and healthcare quality, and minimizing costs.1 
When commentators critique the present system, and when they 
prescribe cures, they understandably focus most closely on healthcare 
providers—physicians, nurses, hospitals, and other persons and institutions 
who provide services to the sick, injured, and infirm2—and on those who 
fund the system—employers, insurers, and government.3  While the 
present debate sometimes also focuses on the citizenry—patients, who are 
the consumers of healthcare products—conspicuously absent from such 
discussions is a consideration of the ability and responsibility of patients to 
participate in decisions concerning their own health care in order to protect 
themselves.  Instead, patients too often are viewed as (and all too willing to 
play the role of) passive recipients of whatever health care the system may 
provide.  Also missing from the debate is the role of those who make and 
sell healthcare products—manufacturers and pharmacists—and how their 
                                                                                                                          
* Carolina Distinguished Professor of Law, University of South Carolina.  Thanks for research 
and editorial assistance to Karen Miller, William Mills, and Douglas Rushton. 
1 See Tom Daschle, Climbing the Hill on Health Care, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at A17 (“The 
goal of meaningful health reform should be to expand coverage, reduce projected costs, improve 
health-system quality, and enhance health-care options for all Americans.”); see also Barack Obama, 
Op-Ed., Why We Need Health Care Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2009, at WK9; Ruth Mantell, 
Meaningful Health-Care Reform Getting Closer: Outline of Changes Likely To Be Enacted Begins To 
Take Shape, MARKETWATCH, Mar. 16, 2009, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/health-care-reform-
consensus-builds-around; Uwe E. Reinhardt, Lost in the Shuffle: The Overarching Goals of Health 
Reform, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX, Aug. 7, 2009, http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/07/lost-in-
the-shuffle-the-overarching-goals-of-health-reform. 
2 See Reinhardt, supra note 1. 
3 See Paul Krugman, Op-Ed., Health Care Realities, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2009, at A23. 
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behavior may exacerbate healthcare problems, how altering their behavior 
may improve healthcare choice and quality, and how these alterations may 
affect healthcare costs. 
These gaps in the healthcare debate are part of a broader failure of the 
present national discussion to focus meaningfully on the role of private law 
in healthcare reform.  One aspect of private law, which only recently has 
begun to be seriously considered an organic part of healthcare reform, is 
the role of medical malpractice litigation in raising the costs of health care 
as a whole.4  The threat of expensive malpractice litigation, it is argued, 
increases costs by making liability insurance for medical providers more 
expensive and by encouraging providers to practice “defensive medicine,” 
such as ordering unnecessary tests and treatments to address even the 
tiniest doubts and aspects of a patient’s condition.5  Tort reform issues of 
this type are important, but although they are beginning to receive some 
attention, that attention so far has been insufficient.  Yet, there is another 
aspect of private law significantly affecting health care in America that has 
managed to remain almost entirely under the radar in the current debate—
the responsibility of makers and sellers of prescription drugs for harm 
caused by dangers in such drugs.  This is the aspect of private law that is 
the subject of this Article. 
The Article begins to fill a gap in the present healthcare debate on the 
role of private law in addressing the problem of dangers in prescription 
drugs.  Part II explores broadly how the American regulatory and medical 
systems work together to promote public health, and what role that leaves 
for private law.  Part III then examines how products liability law has 
evolved with respect to responsibility for harm caused by the design of 
prescription drugs, and Part IV considers the evolving law shielding 
manufacturers and pharmacists from a duty to provide warnings directly to 
drug patients.  Part V proposes that private law be reformed to ban design 
defect litigation against pharmaceutical manufacturers while expanding the 
duties of both manufacturers and pharmacists to warn consumers directly 
of drug dangers.  The Article concludes that such reforms should increase 
healthcare choice and quality, while decreasing healthcare costs. 
                                                                                                                          
4 See Scott Horsley, Could Lawsuit Curbs Pave Way for Health Care Deal?, NPR, Sept. 2, 2009, 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?StoryId=112454986; Barack Obama, President Obama’s 
Health Care Speech to Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/10/us/ 
politics/10obama.text.html?_r=1&ref=politics; Dionne Searcey & Jacob Goldstein, For Health Care, 
Tangible & Unseen Costs, WALL ST. J., Sept. 3, 2009, at A13. 
5 See Kimberley A. Strassel, The President’s Tort Two-Step, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2009, at A17 
(“Experts on left and right agree that defensive medicine—ordering tests and procedures solely to 
protect against Joe Lawyer—adds enormously to health costs.”); see also Searcey & Goldstein, supra 
note 4 (“This is defensive medicine—a careful, fretful approach to treating patients, in which doctors 
authorize tests in part to reduce the risk that they will be sued.”). 
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II.  PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, PRIVATE LAW,                                                          
AND THE HEALTHCARE PROBLEM 
No one should doubt that dangerous pharmaceuticals are a significant 
contributor to the current healthcare crisis, contributing extensively to 
human suffering and substantially increasing healthcare costs.  Each year 
offers new examples of injuries and deaths caused by untoward dangers in 
prescription drugs.  Prominent illustrations from recent years include 
Vioxx, a popular arthritis painkiller that more than doubled the risk of 
heart attacks and strokes,6 a risk that lingered long after users stopped 
taking the drug;7 “Phen-fen,” a diet drug that caused heart damage;8 and 
Propulsid, a drug that reduced gastric acid but also threatened patients’ 
hearts.9  Once information on these side-effects became known to the 
public, the manufacturers of each of these drugs stopped selling them and, 
eventually, paid millions or billions of dollars to settle claims for resulting 
injuries.10  Merck, for example, having withdrawn the profitable Vioxx 
drug11 from the market in 2004, settled nearly 50,000 Vioxx cases in late 
2007 for $4.85 billion.12  In 2009, Eli Lilly agreed to plead guilty and pay 
$1.415 billion in criminal and civil penalties for promoting its 
antipsychotic drug, Zyprexa, as suitable for uses not approved by the Food 
and Drug Administration (“FDA”).13  These cases may be among the more 
prominent, but they represent just the tip of the iceberg of damage caused 
by prescription drugs. 
Many have been frustrated in attempting to figure out just how 
principles of private law, products liability in particular, should be applied 
                                                                                                                          
6 See Parker Waichman Alonso LLP, Yet Another Vioxx Settlement, Aug. 4, 2009, 
http://www.yourlawyer.com/articles/read/16836 [hereinafter Vioxx Settlement]; Official Vioxx 
Settlement, http://www.officialvioxxsettlement.com (last visited Sept. 3, 2009); see also Margaret 
Gilhooley, Addressing Potential Drug Risks: The Limits of Testing, Risk Signals, Preemption, and the 
Drug Reform Legislation, 59 S.C. L. REV. 347, 349–50 (2008) [hereinafter Gilhooley, Addressing 
Risks]; Bextra Doubles Risk of Heart Attack and Stroke, Study Finds, CONSUMER AFFAIRS, Nov. 11, 
2004, http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/vioxx_bextra2.html (stating that Bextra, another Cox-2 
inhibitor, possibly shares the same risk as Vioxx). 
7 Steven Reinberg, Vioxx’s Heart Risk Lingered Long After Use Ended, U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP., Oct. 14, 2008, http://health.usnews.com/articles/health/healthday/2008/10/14/vioxxs-heart-risk-
lingered-long-after-use-ended.html. 
8 Anita Bernstein & Joseph Bernstein, An Information Prescription for Drug Regulation, 54 
BUFF. L. REV. 569, 578–79 (2006). 
9 Id. at 581–82. 
10 See id. at 582 (reporting that Johnson & Johnson paid $90 million in 2004 to settle claims that 
Propulsid caused hundreds of deaths and many thousands of injuries); see also id. at 579 (reporting 
that, in 2004, Wyeth settled the Phen-fen class action for $3.75 billion). 
11 Annual sales of Vioxx reportedly were $2.5 billion.  Vioxx Settlement, supra note 6. 
12 Id. 
13 This amount included a $515 million criminal fine, the largest ever imposed on an individual 
corporation in the United States.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Eli Lilly and Company Agrees to Pay 
$1.415 Billion to Resolve Allegations of Off-label Promotion of Zyprexa (Jan. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/January/09-civ-038.html [hereinafter DOJ Press Release, Jan. 15, 
2009]. 
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to prescription drugs.  Whether and how prescription drugs should be 
treated differently from other products has consumed more time and effort, 
and resulted in the gnashing of more teeth, than about any other 
particularized issue in all of American products liability law.14  In addition 
to featuring two prominent Restatement provisions—comment k to section 
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and section 6 of the 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability—the drug liability story 
wends through two of the most important cases in modern products 
liability law history: Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories15 and Brown v. 
Superior Court,16 which together rescued American law from the great 
strict liability experiment of the 1960s and 1970s and returned principles of 
foreseeable risk and negligence as the bedrock of responsibility for 
manufacturers of pharmaceutical drugs.17 
Drug liability law involves a vast range of complex products liability 
issues, including the battle for supremacy between consumer-oriented and 
manufacturer-oriented liability tests for establishing the defectiveness of a 
product’s design; the never-ending struggle between negligence and strict 
liability; how design and warning defect notions fit together; the 
responsibility of manufacturers for harm from inherent dangers that are 
unforeseeable or otherwise unavoidable under the prevailing state of the 
art; the scope of a manufacturer’s liability for prenatal harm; limitations on 
litigation by a manufacturer’s compliance with federal agency regulations; 
the federal preemption doctrine; and, at bottom, whether prescription drugs 
in fact are sufficiently distinct from other types of products to be treated 
                                                                                                                          
14 For discussion of prescription drug liability, see Anita Bernstein, Enhancing Drug Effectiveness 
and Efficacy Through Personal Injury Litigation, 15 J. L. & POL’Y 1051, 1055–57 (2007) [hereinafter 
Bernstein, Drug Effectiveness]; Bernstein & Bernstein, supra note 8, at 573–74; George W. Conk, The 
True Test: Alternative Safer Designs for Drugs and Medical Devices in a Patent-Constrained Market, 
49 UCLA L. REV. 737, 738–39 (2002) [hereinafter Conk, True Test]; George W. Conk, Is There a 
Design Defect in the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability?, 109 YALE L.J. 1087, 1087–89 
(2000) [hereinafter Conk, Design Defect]; Richard L. Cupp, Jr., The Continuing Search for Proper 
Perspective: Whose Reasonableness Should Be at Issue in a Prescription Product Design Defect 
Analysis?, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 233, 234 (1999); Margaret Gilhooley, When Drugs Are Safe for 
Some but Not Others: The FDA Experience and Alternatives for Products Liability, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 
927, 929–30 (1999); Michael D. Green, Prescription Drugs, Alternative Designs, and the Restatement 
(Third): Preliminary Reflections, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 207, 208–10 (1999); James A. Henderson, 
Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Drug Designs Are Different, 111 YALE L.J. 151, 151–53 (2001); Lars Noah, 
This Is Your Products Liability Restatement on Drugs, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 839 (2009); Victor E. 
Schwartz & Phil Goldberg, A Prescription for Drug Liability and Regulation, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 135, 
136 (2005); Jane Stapleton, Liability for Drugs in the U.S. and EU: Rhetoric and Reality, 26 REV. 
LITIG. 991, 992 (2007).  For a fuller collection of the literature, see DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY LAW § 8.10 n.1 (2d ed. 2008). 
15 479 A.2d 374, 382–83 (N.J. 1984). 
16 751 P.2d 470, 482–83 (Cal. 1988). 
17 On the role of these two cases in the history of tort law, see David G. Owen, Bending Nature, 
Bending Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010). 
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differently by the law.18 
As with most other types of products, manufacturers of prescription 
pharmaceuticals presently are subject to liability on four separate grounds: 
for misrepresenting a drug’s dangers and for selling drugs with defects in 
manufacture, design, or warnings.  There is little debate about the first two 
grounds—all agree that manufacturers should bear the consequences of 
selling drugs that are said to be safe when the manufacturer knows they are 
not, and for selling drugs that are dangerously contaminated.  In private 
law, the raging debates on drug products liability law concern 
responsibility for defects in a drug’s formulation (“design”) and whether 
manufacturers and pharmacists should have a duty—like manufacturers 
and retailers of most other types of products—to warn consumers directly 
of whatever substantial, hidden dangers pharmaceuticals may contain.  As 
will be explored below, the issue of design defectiveness is a troublesome 
but largely phantom issue in modern drug litigation, where, 
notwithstanding the availability of drug design liability, “the liability game 
is with the warnings candle, not with design.”19  Yet American law needs 
to stomp out drug design litigation altogether, and to spread the light of the 
warnings candle, since present legal doctrine misguidedly shields both 
manufacturers and pharmacists from full responsibility to warn consumers 
of the many hazards that lurk within prescription pharmaceuticals. 
A.  The Problem of Dangerous Drugs 
Prescription drugs are paradoxical: as one of the greatest triumphs of 
the twentieth century, their powerful chemicals and biologics save many 
millions of humans from suffering and death; yet, these same chemicals 
also cause great suffering and death.20  All prescription drugs, that is, 
possess substantial costs as well as benefits.  This is because most drug 
hazards are inherent and unavoidable.  Normally, these dangers simply 
cannot be removed: the same chemical properties in drugs that can cause 
great harm to some are the very properties that are therapeutic to others.21  
Put another way, if a drug’s chemical structure were altered to avoid some 
adverse health effect, that same change often would also reduce or 
eliminate the drug’s health benefits.  Thus, a drug’s “design” normally 
cannot be changed to improve its safety. 
 
                                                                                                                          
18 These particular topics are all addressed in OWEN, supra note 14.  This Article draws in part 
from various sections, particularly sections 8.10 and 9.6, of the forthcoming third edition of this 
treatise.  DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (3d ed. forthcoming). 
19 Green, supra note 14, at 209. 
20 “[Indeed,] all drugs do harm.”  Bernstein & Bernstein, supra note 8, at 570. 
21 “Normally,” because the hazard in some drugs may be reduced or eliminated by changing the 
prescribed dosage, the active ingredients in combination drugs, or the inert ingredients used in a drug. 
Green, supra note 14, at 210–12.  On inherent product hazards, see OWEN, supra note 14, §§ 6.2, 10.3. 
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Penicillin may be the classic example of a drug that, while highly 
beneficial to most people, can be hazardous, indeed lethal, to others.22  But, 
other examples abound.  Accutane is a good modern illustration of a drug 
that combines great benefits with great risks of harm: it is highly effective 
in treating the most severe cases of acne; yet, it is a virulent teratogen that 
can cause serious birth defects when given to pregnant women.23  Surely 
the most compelling historical example of this phenomenon is thalidomide, 
another teratogen, prescribed widely as a sedative and for morning 
sickness throughout much of the world (but not the United States) during 
the 1950s and 1960s.24  Despite the enormous toll of birth defects this drug 
then wreaked around the globe, the FDA approved thalidomide in 1998 for 
fighting leprosy.25  These are only three illustrations, and the list of 
unavoidably unsafe drugs goes on and on.26 
Outside of tort law, the American medico-legal systems address this 
conundrum—the bad-comes-with-the-good aspect of prescription drugs—
in two basic ways.27  First, prior to being allowed onto the market, 
prescription drugs must undergo rigorous chemical analysis, laboratory 
testing, and clinical trials, the results of which are closely scrutinized by 
                                                                                                                          
22 See WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 99 (4th ed. 1971). 
23 See Myers v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 170 P.3d 254, 256 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007). 
24 Thalidomide caused severe limb deformities in children born to women who took the drug 
while pregnant.  The FDA’s protracted review of the drug barely saved most Americans from this 
terrible tragedy.  See Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass 
Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 313–14 (1992) (characterizing thalidomide as “one of the most potent 
human teratogens ever found”); see also Anita Bernstein, Formed by Thalidomide: Mass Torts as a 
False Cure for Toxic Exposure, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2153, 2158 n.26 (1997). 
25 See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Thalidomide Approved To Treat Leprosy, with Other Uses Seen, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 17, 1998, at A1. 
26 See PROSSER, supra note 22, § 99 (“The whole pharmacopeia is full of drugs which are not 
safe, and at present cannot be made safe.”). 
27 A third approach that lies outside the tort law system is the no-fault compensation system to 
compensate children suffering adverse reactions to vaccinations required by public health statutes.  See 
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1–300aa-34 (2006).  Claims are 
made in the Court of Claims against the Secretary of Health and Human Services, including recovery 
for economic losses, pain and suffering (limited to $250,000), and death (limited to $250,000).  Id. §§ 
300aa-11(c), 300aa-15(c).  A claimant may accept or reject the court’s award; if it is rejected, the 
claimant may then (and only then) initiate a products liability action against the manufacturer.  Id. § 
300aa-22(b)(1).  The Act, however, bars recovery in such actions for “side effects that were 
unavoidable even though the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper directions 
and warnings.”  Id. § 300aa-22. 
For useful descriptions of the structure of the Act, see Okianer C. Dark, Is the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 the Solution for the DTP Controversy?, 19 U. TOL. L. REV. 799, 839–42 
(1988); Lars Noah, Triage in the Nation’s Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling Scarcity of Vaccines and 
Other Drugs, 54 S.C. L. REV. 741, 761–62 (2002); Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of 
a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951, 958–60 (1993); Derry 
Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 59, 62–64 (1999); Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, 
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 
OHIO ST. L.J. 387, 389–91 (1987); Whitney S. Waldenberg & Sarah E. Wallace, When Science Is 
Silent: Examining Compensation of Vaccine-Related Injuries When Scientific Evidence of Causation Is 
Inconclusive, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 303, 305–07 (2007). 
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the FDA, to assure both the safety and efficacy of all new drugs.  Under 
the amended Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,28  Congress has 
vested more regulatory power in the FDA to regulate drug safety than it 
has vested in other agencies to regulate the safety of other products, 
reflecting the special role of prescription drugs in preserving life and health 
together with the special dangers such drugs pose to life and health.  A key 
function of the FDA is to help ensure that only drugs that, on balance, are 
beneficial to some class of patients ever reach the healthcare market.29 
The second relevant feature of America’s medico-legal system is that it 
positions experts in diagnosis and drug therapy—doctors and nurse 
practitioners—between beneficial yet dangerous prescription drugs, on the 
one hand, and the lay public who need drug therapy, on the other.  The role 
of such healthcare professionals, such “learned intermediaries,” is to 
connect individual drugs with individual patients—to choose from among 
the panoply of available prescription drugs the one with the highest 
benefit-risk ratio for each particular patient’s needs.  That is, a doctor’s 
role in drug therapy is to ensure that the right prescription medicine, in 
view of its particular benefits and risks, is assigned to the right patient, in 
view of that patient’s special needs.30 
B.  The Question for Private Law 
The question of interest here is what role, if any, does the medico-legal 
system leave for private law—the law of torts and products liability?  
Because the system just described breaks down in many ways in practice, 
American products liability law has assumed a vital role in compensating 
 
                                                                                                                          
28 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006); see also id. § 331(a) (prohibiting the sale of “any food, drug, 
device, or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded”); id. § 355(a) (requiring FDA approval prior to 
the marketing of any new drug). 
29 For discussion of the FDA and drug regulation, see Bernstein, Drug Effectiveness, supra note 
14, at 1062–67; Bernstein & Bernstein, supra note 8, at 569–71; Daniel R. Cahoy, Medical Product 
Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox, 82 IND. L.J. 623, 624–26 (2007); Richard A. 
Epstein, Regulatory Paternalism in the Market for Drugs: Lessons from Vioxx and Celebrex, 5 YALE J. 
HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 741, 748–49 (2005); Gilhooley, Addressing Risks, supra note 6, at 349–
51; Michael D. Green, Safety as an Element of Pharmaceutical Quality: The Respective Roles of 
Regulation and Tort Law, 42 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 163, 167–68 (1998); Marc T. Law, How Do Regulators 
Regulate? Enforcement of the Pure Food and Drugs Act, 1907–38, 22 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 459, 460–61 
(2006); Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. 
REV. 1753, 1753–54 (1996) [hereinafter Merrill, Architecture]; Richard A. Merrill, Compensation for 
Prescription Drug Injuries, 59 VA. L. REV. 1, 8–11 (1973) [hereinafter Merrill, Compensation]; Teresa 
M. Schwartz, Regulatory Standards and Products Liability: Striking the Right Balance Between the 
Two, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 431, 445–46 (1997) [hereinafter Schwartz, Striking the Right Balance]; 
Teresa M. Schwartz, The Role of Federal Safety Regulations in Products Liability Actions, 41 VAND. 
L. REV. 1121, 1147–49 (1988) [hereinafter Schwartz, Role of Federal Safety Regulations]; Catherine T. 
Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Compensation, and the Role of 
Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 587, 594–97 (2005). 
30 See infra Part IV.D.1. (examining the “learned intermediary doctrine”). 
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persons harmed unnecessarily by defective drugs, and some role in 
promoting drug safety by deterring the sale of such unnecessarily 
dangerous drugs.  The model of a perfect FDA, unfortunately, does not fit 
the real world closely.  Legislative, budgetary, and political constraints mar 
the ideal of a regulatory body that optimally protects the public from 
exposure to defective drugs.31  Nor, as most people painfully well know, do 
doctors typically match prescription drugs to patients in a manner that 
approaches optimality.32  Thus, due to these and other shortcomings in the 
medico-legal structure for the production and distribution of prescription 
drugs in the United States, products liability law plays a significant role in 
compensating, and hopefully helping to protect, consumers of defective 
prescription drugs. 
Because the answer to the question posed above is that American 
products liability law plays an important role when people suffer harm 
from prescription drugs, we must inquire into what that role is and what it 
should be.  The following inquiry reveals that courts, commentators, and 
the Torts Restatements mostly agree that the American products liability 
system should place its primary emphasis on assuring that doctors and 
(indirectly) patients receive adequate warnings about drug dangers, and 
instructions on how to avoid them, and that judicial reevaluations of 
prescription drug designs should be limited.  How these general 
propositions have evolved doctrinally in the Restatements and the courts is 
first explored, beginning with a consideration of a drug manufacturer’s 
duty of safe design and followed by a consideration of the limited warning 
duties of both drug manufacturers and pharmacists.  This Article then 
inquires into how current principles of responsibility for harm from 
prescription drugs might be reformed to better address the fundamental 
goals of America’s healthcare system. 
 
                                                                                                                          
31 For discussion of weaknesses present in the FDA model, see George W. Conk, Punctuated 
Equilibrium: Why Section 402A Flourished and the Third Restatement Languished, 26 REV. LITIG. 
799, 860–61 (2007); Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History and the Need for Better Procedures and 
Better Testing, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 941, 941–43 (2007) [hereinafter Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History]; 
Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2075–77 (2000); Schwartz, 
Role of Federal Safety Regulations, supra note 29, at 1154–58.  Congress addressed some of the 
weaknesses in the Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, which expanded agency 
oversight of drug safety and provided the agency with additional resources.  See Food and Drug 
Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823, 825, 842 (2007); see also  
Morgan Weiland, FDA: President Bush Signs FDA Legislation Expanding Drug Safety, Drug, Device 
Fees, PRODUCT LIABILITY DAILY (BNA), Sept. 28, 2007, at D7. 
32 Apart from the increasingly limited time doctors devote to treating each patient, doctors 
typically receive woefully limited education on pharmaceuticals.  See infra note 162 and accompanying 
text (noting that doctors typically know less than pharmacists about drugs); see also FRANK M. 
MCCLELLAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: LAW, TACTICS, AND ETHICS 188–89 (1994) (discussing the 
limited knowledge and inadequate training of physicians in drug therapy); Green, supra note 14, at 229 
n.67 (explaining how the “idealized role of the physician is not borne out in practice”). 
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III.  DESIGN DANGERS IN PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS 
Design defectiveness has never been a favored theory of recovery for 
drug injuries.  While strict liability in tort generally got off the ground in 
America in the 1960s, and while design defect claims for most types of 
products became prevalent during the 1970s, American courts did not even 
begin imposing design defect liability on drug manufacturers until the 
1980s and 1990s.33  And even to the present, most courts in the United 
States are chary in allowing such claims, properly directing drug litigation 
away from design defect claims to warning claims. 
A.  The Controversial Comment k 
An attempt to understand how the notion of a design defect fits 
together with prescription drugs in American products liability law ideally 
should begin with a study of the chemical properties, manufacturing 
techniques, marketing approaches, and therapeutic applications of this 
peculiar type of product.  Yet, because time and space require that such 
deep explorations be left to specialized texts34 and journal articles35 on 
drugs, the best place to begin the inquiry here is with comment k, a 
controversial comment to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts.  In a nutshell, comment k provides that manufacturers are not subject 
to strict liability in tort for harm caused by certain “unavoidably unsafe” 
but useful products, notably prescription drugs, on the basis that their 
inherent hazards cannot feasibly be designed away.36  The Reporter for the 
                                                                                                                          
33 Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. is widely thought to be the first prescription drug case 
in which a defective drug design claim figured prominently.  See Brochu v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 642 
F.2d 652, 655 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that a manufacturer of oral contraceptives could be held liable 
for design defect inherent in high content of estrogen in a pill).  A small number of earlier cases also 
involved challenges to drug designs.  See Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp. 432, 444–46 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968) (ruling that an unstable pertussis vaccine that damaged an infant’s brain was 
unmerchantable), aff’d as modified, 411 F.2d 48, 53 (2d Cir. 1969); Stromsodt v. Parke-Davis & Co., 
257 F. Supp. 991, 994 (D.N.D. 1966) (holding that a defect in manufacturer’s drug caused damage to 
brain), aff’d, 411 F.2d 1390, 1402 (8th Cir. 1969). 
34 See 5 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY ch. 50 (Cary Stewart 
Sklaren ed., 2007) (examining drug litigation); see also 1 FRANK C. WOODSIDE, DRUG PRODUCT 
LIABILITY ch. 3 (2009) (examining principles of pharmacology). 
35 See supra note 14. 
36 In fact, this is the theme of three companion comments to section 402A: comments i, j, and k.  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. i–k (1965); see also OWEN, supra note 14, § 6.2 
(examining these three comments in depth).  In full, comment k provides: 
k. Unavoidably unsafe products.  There are some products which, in the present state 
of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and 
ordinary use.  These are especially common in the field of drugs.  An outstanding 
example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treatment of rabies, which not uncommonly 
leads to very serious and damaging consequences when it is injected.  Since the 
disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the marketing and the use of 
the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable high degree of risk 
which they involve.  Such a product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper 
directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.  The same 
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Second Restatement who drafted comment k, William Prosser, justified this 
exemption in a famous quote: 
The argument that industries producing potentially dangerous 
products should make good the harm, distribute it by liability 
insurance, and add the cost to the price of the product, 
encounters reason for pause, when we consider that two of 
the greatest medical boons to the human race, penicillin and 
cortisone, both have their dangerous side-effects, and that 
drug companies might well have been deterred from 
producing and selling them.37 
Drugs, in short, are different.38  As a result, most American courts 
agree that comment k properly exempts useful prescription drugs that are 
unavoidably unsafe from strict products liability,39 assuming always that 
                                                                                                                          
is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very reason 
cannot legally be sold except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician.  
It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of 
lack of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no 
assurance of safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as 
there is justifies the marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically 
recognizable risk.  The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they 
are properly prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation 
calls for it, is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending 
their use, merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently 
useful and desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. k (1965). 
37 PROSSER, supra note 22, § 99. 
38 See Henderson & Twerski, supra note 14, at 153 (explaining that drugs are different from other 
products and should be treated differently under the Restatement); Daniel P. Richardson, Note, The 
Lost Child of Products Liability: New Thoughts About Advertising and the Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine, 27 VT. L. REV. 1017, 1049 (2003).  Professor Michael Green has catalogued various ways in 
which drugs are different: (1) “they cannot be manipulated physically to provide marginally greater 
safety”; (2) they are harmful for some people while beneficial for others; (3) their adverse effects 
frequently are not discoverable through research and testing, such that these harmful effects are not 
revealed until they injure drug consumers; (4) they are subject to especially heavy regulatory oversight, 
much of it pre-market, by the FDA; (5) they have high social utility; and (6) learned intermediaries, i.e., 
doctors, stand between drug products and consumers, matching particular drugs to particular people.  
Green, supra note 14, at 209–11, 232.  To these six claims of difference, a seventh might be added: (7) 
they are extremely costly to bring to market—each new brand name prescription drug on average 
costing roughly $500 million for research, development, laboratory testing, clinical testing, FDA 
submission work, and production. 
For information on the costs of getting a single new prescription pharmaceutical to market, see 
Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the Pharmaceutical 
Industry Gone Too Far?, 41 IDEA 227, 231 (2001) (listing an estimated cost of between $250 and 
$500 million based on the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economic Staff Reporting); 
Margaret Z. Johns, Informed Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-Label Prescriptions and 
Conflicts of Interest, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 967, 973 (2007) (“The FDA approval process takes six to 
fifteen years and costs between $100 million and $880 million per drug.”); Justin C. Ward, Note, Bayer 
v. Schein Pharmaceuticals—Best Mode Requirement—In Chemical Inventions:  When Does “Carrying 
Out the Invention” Start?  A Proposal for a Comprehensive Best Mode Compliance Test, 3 CHI.-KENT 
J. INTELL. PROP. 120, 142 n.25 (2003) (estimating a cost of $800 million). 
39 See 1 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, § 8.07[3] (citing cases from thirty states and the 
District of Columbia applying comment k).  A small number of courts have explicitly rejected comment 
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they are properly prepared and carry adequate warnings.40 
In addition to disagreeing about comment k’s very premise—that 
prescription drug manufacturers should be protected from the rigors of 
strict liability—courts and commentators disagree about a number of other, 
important aspects of comment k, including (1) whether its application is 
confined to a limited class of drugs properly characterized as “unavoidably 
unsafe,” or whether it broadly applies to all prescription drugs; and (2) 
whether the exemption it affords from strict liability in tort applies as well 
to negligence.  On the first question, the New Jersey Supreme Court in 
1984 ruled in Feldman v. Lederle Laboratories41 that only certain drugs 
qualify for comment k’s exemption from design defect liability—those 
proven on a case-by-case basis to be highly useful and unavoidably 
unsafe.42  The year after Feldman, a California intermediate appellate court 
decided Kearl v. Lederle Laboratories,43 in which it adopted and 
elaborated upon the Feldman approach, prescribing a detailed “mini-trial” 
necessary before a judge could qualify a drug for exemption from strict 
liability under comment k.44  Soon thereafter, however, the California 
Supreme Court rejected the Feldman-Kearl approach in Brown v. Superior 
Court, interpreting comment k as embracing all prescription drugs within 
its unavoidably-unsafe safe harbor.45  The Brown court reasoned that 
forcing drug manufacturers to litigate whether their drugs deserve design-
defect exemption in every case would emasculate comment k’s objective of 
                                                                                                                          
k.  See, e.g., Allison v. Merck & Co., 878 P.2d 948, 954 (Nev. 1994) (holding that comment k does not 
apply because the victim chose to be injected having known the potential consequences); Collins v. Eli 
Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 52 (Wis. 1984) (holding that comment k is too restrictive); see also Shanks 
v. Upjohn Co., 835 P.2d 1189, 1197–98 (Alaska 1992) (refusing to adopt comment k but agreeing with 
its basic policy). 
40 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
41 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984). 
42 Id. at 382–83. 
Comment k immunizes from strict liability the manufacturers of some products, 
including certain drugs, that are unavoidably unsafe.  However, we see no reason to 
hold as a matter of law and policy that all prescription drugs that are unsafe are 
unavoidably so.  Drugs, like any other products, may contain defects that could have 
been avoided by better manufacturing or design.  Whether a drug is unavoidably 
unsafe should be decided on a case-by-case basis; we perceive no justification [in 
policy or under comment k for immunizing prescription drug manufacturers from 
their safe manufacturing, warning, and risk-utility design obligations under strict 
liability in tort.] 
Id. at 383. 
43 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
44 Sitting in this phase of the trial without a jury, the judge would determine: 
(1) whether, when distributed, the product was intended to confer an exceptionally 
important benefit that made its availability highly desirable; (2) whether the then-
existing risk posed by the product both was “substantial” and “unavoidable”; and 
(3) whether the interest in availability (again measured as of the time of 
distribution) outweighs the interest in promoting enhanced accountability through 
strict liability design defect review. 
Id. at 464; see also Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 840–41 (Neb. 2000). 
45 Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 482 (Cal. 1988). 
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shielding prescription drug manufacturers ex ante from the risks of design 
defect litigation ex post in order to reduce the perils of “overdeterrence,” 
such as higher drug prices and fewer new drugs.46  While a few courts have 
followed Brown’s general exemption of all prescription drugs from design 
defect liability,47 most courts have taken the Feldman-Kearl case-by-case 
approach, reluctant to surrender judicial oversight of a drug manufacturer’s 
responsibility for safety in design.48 
Another aspect of comment k that engenders some debate is whether 
comment k, assuming (as almost all courts do) that it exempts 
manufacturers of at least some drugs from strict liability in tort, should 
exempt them also from liability in negligence for defects in design.49  The 
language of comment k, which should not be parsed as if it were a statute, 
does not address the question of a drug manufacturer’s liability in 
negligence for defects in design.  After all, this provision is a comment to 
section 402A, which addresses a seller’s strict liability in tort—not 
negligence, which is a different topic the Restatement separately addresses 
in another section.50  Apart from this quite obvious fact, the debate may be 
resolved quite simply: if the design of a drug is not defective for purposes 
of strict liability in tort, it cannot be negligent to sell it in that nondefective 
condition.51 
While this kind of doctrinal, set-theory reasoning normally is sound, it 
falters somewhat in the special context of prescription drugs.  Comment k 
exempts all prescription drugs from strict liability in tort, not because they 
all are truly nondefective, but because (1) most drugs are (due to market 
competition and oversight by the FDA); and (2) a protective umbrella 
                                                                                                                          
46 Id. at 479–80. 
47 For decisions supporting the exemption of all prescription drugs from liability, see Transue v. 
Aesthetech Corp., 341 F.3d 911, 916 (9th Cir. 2003); McKee v. Moore, 648 P.2d 21, 24 (Okla. 1982); 
Adams v. Wyeth, No. 3452, 2005 WL 1528656, at *3–4 (Phila. Ct. Com. Pl. June 13, 2005); 
Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991). 
48 For decisions supporting a case-by-case approach, see West v. Searle & Co., 806 S.W.2d 608, 
612 (Ark. 1991); Adams v. G.D. Searle & Co., 576 So. 2d 728, 731 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Bryant 
v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 728 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Toner v. Lederle Labs., 732 
P.2d 297, 308 (Idaho 1987); Glassman v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 606 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992); 
Savina v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 795 P.2d 915, 924 (Kan. 1990); Bennett v. Madakasira, 821 So. 2d 794, 
809 (Miss. 2002); Freeman, 618 N.W.2d at 837; Hill v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 4:03CV1526 JCH, 2007 WL 
674251, at *4–5 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 28, 2007); White v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 533 N.E.2d 748, 752 (Ohio 
1988); Castrignano v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 546 A.2d 775, 781 (R.I. 1988). 
49 Most courts hold that negligence liability in fact applies to the design of drugs.  See, e.g., 
Toner, 732 P.2d at 310; Johnson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 718 P.2d 1318, 1324–25 (Kan. 1986). 
50 The Second Restatement addresses a manufacturer’s negligent design of products in section 
395, which makes no reference to liability for the sale of dangerous drugs.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 395 (1965). 
51 See PROSSER, supra note 22, § 99 (“Where only negligence liability is in question, the answer 
as to such products [inherently hazardous drugs] is usually a simple one.  The utility and social value of 
the thing sold normally outweighs the known, and all the more so the unknown risk, and there is no 
negligence in selling it, provided always that proper warning and directions are given.”); see also 
OWEN, supra note 14, §§ 2.1, 5.9. 
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shielding all prescription drugs (including the defective ones) from strict 
liability avoids discouraging manufacturers from developing important 
new drugs (most of which will be nondefective) and from setting high drug 
prices.  Thus, some prescription drugs probably are “defective” in design 
notwithstanding the comment k exemption, and the manufacturers of some 
of those defective drugs may well have been negligent in their 
development and sale. 
Even if strict liability for design defects is allowed in prescription drug 
cases, its usefulness to consumers appears quite limited.  Because the 
doctor is the “consumer” in such cases under the learned intermediary 
rule,52 the consumer expectations test provides no relief to patients 
suffering foreseeable drug injuries if the manufacturer adequately warned 
doctors of that risk.  And if the drug contains foreseeable dangers that 
doctors do not expect, failure-to-warn claims protect persons injured by 
such drugs.  Finally, because almost all American jurisdictions now shield 
manufacturers from liability for dangers that are unforeseeable under the 
prevailing state of the art,53 patients injured by an unforeseeable drug risk 
in most American courts have no claim under any liability test or theory. 
Under a risk-utility test (whether based on “negligence,” “strict 
liability,” or simply “design defectiveness”),54 a manufacturer is subject to 
liability for failing to adopt a particular design feature that would have 
prevented the plaintiff’s harm if the safety benefits of the untaken design 
feature were greater than its costs.55  But this suggests that a drug can be 
re-engineered to eliminate a particular danger without sacrificing its health 
benefits, which normally is impossible since the hazards in most drugs, as 
mentioned earlier, are inherent and unavoidable.56  This leaves only one 
narrow version of risk-benefit analysis available for properly assessing the 
defectiveness of a drug’s design: the approach adopted by the Third 
Restatement. 
B.  The Third Restatement 
In 1998, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) promulgated a liability 
standard for defective drug designs that is unusual, to say the least.  
Section 6(c) of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (the 
“Third Restatement”) provides: 
(c) A prescription drug or medical device is not 
reasonably safe due to defective design if the foreseeable 
risks of harm posed by the drug or medical device are 
                                                                                                                          
52 See infra Part IV.D.1. 
53 See OWEN, supra note 14, § 10.4. 
54 Id. §§ 2.2, 5.7, 8.4. 
55 See id. §§ 8.4–.5, 8.8. 
56 See supra Part II.A. 
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sufficiently great in relation to its foreseeable therapeutic 
benefits that reasonable health-care providers, knowing of 
such foreseeable risks and therapeutic benefits, would not 
prescribe the drug or medical device for any class of 
patients.57 
The most important thing to note about this novel liability standard, 
which has been judicially applied,58 is that it leaves a very small window 
for design defect claims for prescription drugs, a window so tiny that 
almost no drug claim could fit through it.  Even thalidomide would not be 
captured by the Third Restatement test because of its value in treating 
leprosy.  But thalidomide may prove the virtue of this test, rather than its 
frailty, for who reasonably can argue that lepers should be deprived of 
beneficial drug therapy because some doctors improperly give the drug to 
child-bearing women.  In such a case, the defect, it would seem, would lie 
in the doctor rather than the drug.  While not minimizing the tragedy of a 
child born deformed to a woman who was prescribed the drug improperly, 
perhaps tort (and possibly criminal) remedies against the prescribing 
doctor would be a better way to address the problem, rather than forcing 
the manufacturer and lepers to suffer from an untoward misuse of a 
pharmaceutical that is highly beneficial to at least one class of patients. 
In a world in which the medico-legal scheme described earlier operates 
with perfection—where manufacturers carefully conduct, and act 
appropriately upon, drug-safety investigations; where a fully-funded, and 
politically neutral, FDA keeps drugs with foreseeable excess dangers from 
being sold; and where doctors perfectly match individual drugs to 
individual patients—the section 6(c) formulation of design defectiveness 
for drugs would appear ideal.  The problem, of course, is that models of a 
perfect FDA and of perfect prescribing doctors are quite inaccurate.  But 
the solution to imperfections in the medico-legal framework is not to allow 
juries to engage in risk-utility comparisons between different drugs used to 
treat the same condition. 
Assume that three drugs, A, B, and C, each are used to fight lung 
infections, and that drug A causes drowsiness in some persons, drug B 
causes birth defects when given to some women, and drug C causes acne in 
some teenage boys.  A doctor presumably would prescribe drug B or 
possibly C to an adult male truck driver, drug A or B to a teenage boy, and 
drug A or C to a woman capable of bearing children.  Assuming that each 
                                                                                                                          
57 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(c) (1998). 
58 See Gebhardt v. Mentor Corp., 191 F.R.D. 180, 185 (D. Ariz. 1999) (granting summary 
judgment for manufacturer because plaintiff failed to prove that a reasonable healthcare provider would 
not have prescribed an Angelchik for any class of patients), aff’d, 15 F. App’x 540 (9th Cir. 2001); see 
also Madsen v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 477 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1037 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (providing an 
example where the defendant’s expert testified that “risks of obesity for some patients are greater than 
the risks of [dietary] medications”). 
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drug bears proper warnings, surely the law should not allow juries to 
impose substantial economic costs on the manufacturer of any of these 
drugs because a prescribing doctor matches one drug to the wrong patient.  
Nor should these manufacturers have to litigate such cases of mis-
prescription, over and over again in courtrooms around the nation, 
assuming further, of course that they fully and properly performed their 
investigation and reporting duties to the FDA.  Nor should consumers be 
deprived of one or two of these drugs because the litigation costs 
(including occasional lost verdicts) prove too burdensome for 
manufacturers to keep them on the market, particularly when juries begin 
to classify one drug of the three as causing the least net harm to all these 
patient groups, considered as a whole.59 
This latter example reveals the perils of using a global, macro-balance 
approach to risk-utility analysis.60  Notwithstanding the frailties of doctors 
and the FDA, a drug’s design should not be characterized as defective on 
the ground that its total harm to all users exceeds its total benefits to all 
users, assuming that the drug provides net benefits to any class of patients, 
and assuming further that the drug’s excessive harm results from its 
improper use by doctors.61  Applying such a macro-balance test to declare 
drug designs defective in such cases would be both “unfair and 
inefficient,” in the words of the Third Restatement Reporters, because it 
“would require courts to deny classes of patients access to a particular drug 
that provides them unique benefits in order to protect other patients from 
the risks of misprescription by negligent physicians.”62 
Pointing to the weaknesses in the FDA and healthcare delivery 
systems, the natural profit motivations of drug manufacturers to skimp on 
product research and design,63 a patent system that artificially protects 
                                                                                                                          
59 See infra text accompanying note 195. 
60 For a discussion of “macro-balancing” and “micro-balancing,” see generally David G. Owen, 
Toward a Proper Test for Design Defectiveness: “Micro-Balancing” Costs and Benefits, 75 TEX. L. 
REV. 1661 (1997). 
61 This assumes that a manufacturer’s sales representatives do not promote the drug for such 
improper use, in which case the manufacturer should be subject to liability.  On the prevalence of such 
promotion, see Gardiner Harris, Pfizer To Pay $2.3 Billion To Settle Inquiry over Marketing Case, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, at B4; DOJ Press Release, Jan. 15, 2009, supra note 13.  On the prevalence 
of off-label use by physicians, see Johns, supra note 38, at 968–69; Lars A. Noah, Constraints on the 
Off–Label Uses of Prescription Drug Products, 16 J. PROD. & TOXICS LIAB. 139, 139–41 (1994).  On 
the ignorance of many doctors as to whether common drugs’ uses are or are not off-label, see Kevin B. 
O’Reilly, Physicians Know FDA-OK’d Uses for Drugs Half the Time, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 7, 2009, 
at 21. 
62 Henderson & Twerski, supra note 14, at 152–53.  For commentary that agrees that section 6(c) 
basically is sound, if in need of some improvement, see Bernstein, Drug Effectiveness, supra note 14, at 
1088–94 (suggesting how courts may “modify the radicalism of § 6(c)”); Green, supra note 14, at 209. 
63 See Jeffrey D. Winchester, Note, Section 8(c) of the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Is 
It Really What the Doctor Ordered?, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 644, 692 (1997) (“[I]n light of the enormous 
amounts of money at stake in the global pharmaceutical industry, manufacturers are inevitably tempted 
to market products that are clearly less effective and more dangerous than others.”). 
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manufacturers from competition, and the industry’s temptation to over-
promote its products,64 some courts and commentators reject the Third 
Restatement’s narrow definition of design defectiveness for drugs.65  The 
argument for rejecting section 6(c) is the belief that drug designs should be 
subject to private law challenge on some basis or another—either by means 
of a normal risk-utility test (on proof of a safer alternative design) or a 
macro-balance test (on proof that a drug caused patients as a whole more 
harm than good).  Yet, neither approach works well in most drug cases, as 
previously discussed.  The first simply does not work because most drugs 
cannot be redesigned, since their hazards are inherent.  As for the second 
test, it is true that any product that causes more harm than good is truly bad 
(“defective”) from a utilitarian point of view.  And, if there were an 
effective way to identify such products, their manufacturers might fairly be 
required to pay for all the harm they cause, and such products normally 
should be banned.66  As discussed above, however, particular classes of 
patients (e.g., lepers) deserve therapy from drugs, even if doctors 
sometimes do misuse those drugs on other classes of patients.  Moreover, 
there is a devil residing in the process of distinguishing which drugs, on 
balance, have net value from those that produce net harm—and in the 
threat of repeated litigation over the ultimate social value of any type of 
drug that causes someone harm because it did not suit that patient. 
So the Third Restatement’s test for defective drug designs, though very 
narrow, and incomplete in failing to identify important exceptions,67 seems 
basically correct.  By putting most drugs beyond the reach of design defect 
litigation (under any liability theory), the Third Restatement properly pours 
most litigation concerning hazardous drugs into the defectiveness of their 
warnings and instructions,68 to which the discussion now turns. 
                                                                                                                          
64 See Harris, supra note 61 (describing “the largest health care fraud settlement and the largest 
criminal fine of any kind ever” resulting from Pfizer’s illegal marketing of Bextra and other drugs). 
65 See Bryant v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 585 S.E.2d 723, 725–28 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003); Freeman 
v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 839–40 (Neb. 2000); Conk, True Test, supra note 14, at 
738–40; Conk, Design Defect, supra note 14, at 1088–89; Cupp, supra note 14, at 234; Richard L. 
Cupp, Jr., Rethinking Conscious Design Liability for Prescription Drugs: The Restatement (Third) 
Standard Versus a Negligence Approach, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 76, 80 (1994); Jerry J. Phillips, The 
Unreasonably Unsafe Product and Strict Liability, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 129, 130 (1996); Schwartz, 
Striking the Right Balance, supra note 29, at 459; Teresa M. Schwartz, Prescription Products and the 
Proposed Restatement (Third), 61 TENN. L. REV. 1357, 1378–85 (1994) [hereinafter Schwartz, 
Prescription Products]; Dustin R. Marlowe, Note, A Dose of Reality for Section 6(c) of the Restatement 
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability, 39 GA. L. REV. 1445, 1446–48 (2005). 
66 See OWEN, supra note 14, § 10.3. 
67 For discussions of some exceptions to the Third Restatement’s test, see William A. Dreier, 
Manufacturers’ Liability for Drugs and Medical Devices Under the Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Products Liability, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 258, 262 (1999); Green, supra note 14, at 219–20. 
68 While section 6(c) might seemingly be improved by including a proviso that allows claims for a 
manufacturer’s failure to meet its research and reporting responsibilities to the FDA, robust warning 
claim enforcement (without preemption interference) appears a better way for products liability law to 
perform its oversight of those responsibilities. 
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IV.  WARNING OF DANGERS IN PHARMACEUTICAL DRUGS 
Warning issues in cases involving prescription drugs in many ways 
parallel those issues in other types of products liability cases.  Yet, as seen 
in connection with design defectiveness,69 prescription drugs raise a variety 
of special problems for products liability litigation.  While design 
defectiveness is the most prevalent claim in most products liability cases,70 
warning claims dominate prescription drug litigation.71 
Several important warning issues recur in cases involving drugs.  One 
concerns the theories of liability applicable to this type of case.  Another 
involves the regulatory backdrop to this area of the law, provided by the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, administered by the FDA.  
A further issue is whom a manufacturer of such products should warn—the 
doctor and the patient, or just the doctor.  Whether a warning or instruction 
about a drug is “adequate” is usually the principal issue in this type of 
litigation.  A final question is whether pharmacists should have a duty to 
warn patients about prescription drug risks at all, and, if so, what the scope 
of that duty should be.  A wealth of information is available on each of 
these important issues,72 and each is briefly considered here. 
                                                                                                                          
69 See supra Part III. 
70 See OWEN, supra note 14, § 1.3. 
71 “Failure to instruct or warn is the major basis of liability for manufacturers of prescription 
drugs and medical devices.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6 cmt. d (1998). 
72 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998); 5 FRUMER & 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 34, §§ 50.01–.08 (providing an overview of drug litigation and liability issues); 
Bernstein, Drug Effectiveness, supra note 14, at 1052–53 (exploring drug ineffectiveness as a basis for 
liability); William A. Dreier, Liability for Drug Advertising, Warnings, and Frauds, 58 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 615, 616–17 (2006) (addressing state and federal control over consumer information in the 
pharmaceutical industry); Barry R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability for Bad Outcomes from Drug Therapy: 
The Doctor, the Hospital, the Pharmacy, and the Drug Firm, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 377, 378–79 (1996) 
(discussing the potential for danger with improperly prescribed drugs); Gilhooley, Addressing Risks, 
supra note 6, at 350 (examining the role of the FDA in addressing drug risks); Gilhooley, Vioxx’s 
History, supra note 31, at 942–43 (using the example of Vioxx to explore regulatory issues and the 
need for reform); M. Stuart Madden, The Enduring Paradox of Products Liability Law Relating to 
Prescription Pharmaceuticals, 21 PACE L. REV. 313, 314 (2001) (arguing that courts and legislatures 
have taken a protective approach to drug liability cases); James T. O’Reilly, Pin the Tail on the Other 
Donkey: Allocating and Avoiding Injury Losses After Drug or Device Approval, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
559, 571–72 (2007) (exploring potential solutions for better protection of patients in drug liability 
cases); Schwartz & Goldberg, supra note 14, at 136–37 (discussing liability issues that arise when a 
class of patients experiences negative side effects despite full compliance with FDA regulations); 
Stapleton, supra note 14, at 993 (comparing prescription drug liability issues in the United States to the 
European Union); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescription 
Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 883, 931–49 (1996) (examining problems with the current drug regulation scheme); Schwartz, 
Prescription Products, supra note 65, at 1363–64, 1369–85 (reviewing proposed changes to drug 
liability in the Restatement (Third)); see generally Chester Chuang, Note, Is There a Doctor in the 
House? Using Failure-To-Warn Liability To Enhance the Safety of Online Prescribing, 75 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1452 (2000) (analyzing warning liability for online prescribing). 
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A.  The Liability Theory Puzzle 
Settling on a proper theory of liability for inadequate warnings and 
instructions has been of greater interest in cases involving prescription 
drugs than any other type of product.  Courts widely apply all three 
theories of liability to cases of this type—negligence, breach of the implied 
warranty of merchantability, and strict liability in tort73—as well as special 
warning liability provisions of state products liability statutes.74  Courts 
have been drawn to negligence principles in warning cases more than in 
cases involving other types of defects,75 and this has been especially true 
where prescription drugs are involved.  Except for cases of contamination, 
drugs were largely exempted from strict liability in tort from the very start 
of modern products liability law in section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts,76 and courts have continued to apply negligence 
principles—and to reject true strict liability principles—in landmark 
prescription drug cases over the years.77 
The reasons for preferring negligence principles to true strict liability 
in drug warning cases run broad and deep,78 but they are worth 
summarizing here.  First, banning foreseeability from the liability 
calculus—the principal way in which strict liability distinguishes itself 
from negligence—does violence to basic principles of justice and fair 
play.79  Another reason for preferring negligence principles in this context 
has been the belief that the extra deterrent effect of strict liability is less 
necessary for products whose warnings must be specifically approved prior 
to marketing by the FDA,80 as discussed below.  A related reason is the 
                                                                                                                          
73 See Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 761 (Ky. 2004). 
74 See Graham v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 350 F.3d 496, 513–14 (6th Cir. 2003) (addressing an Ohio 
statute that defines warning defects in negligence terms); Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 
1263–64 (N.J. 1999) (holding that direct marketing to consumers creates a duty to warn of defects, as 
an exception to New Jersey’s codification of the learned intermediary doctrine). 
75 See OWEN, supra note 14, § 9.2. 
76 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmts. j–k (1965); Madden, supra note 72, at 
321–24. 
77 See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 477 (Cal. 1988) (rejecting strict liability and 
concluding that comment k is the appropriate test for determining responsibility for defectively 
designed drugs); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374, 386 (N.J. 1984) (finding that in warning 
cases, negligence and strict liability are “functional equivalents”); see also Vassallo v. Baxter 
Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 923–24 (Mass. 1998) (discussing the functional equivalency of 
negligence and strict liability in the case of breast implants).  But see Carlin v. Superior Court, 920 P.2d 
1347, 1350–51 (Cal. 1996) (holding that while “strict liability is to some extent a hybrid of traditional 
strict liability and negligence doctrine,” because a manufacturer’s “strict liability” duty to warn 
embraces only risks “known to the scientific community at the time” of manufacture, strict liability in 
tort and warranty nevertheless remain viable claims in drug warning cases). 
78 See OWEN, supra note 14, §§ 6.2, 10.3. 
79 See David G. Owen, Figuring Foreseeability, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1277 (2009); David G. 
Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 427, 437, 448 (1993). 
80 See Brown, 751 P.2d at 482–83 (holding that defendant drug manufacturer could not be held 
strictly liable for injuries caused by a prescription drug “so long as the drug was properly prepared and 
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possibility that strict liability may result in too much deterrence, that 
pharmaceutical manufacturers may be discouraged from investing in new 
prescription drugs, already extremely expensive to develop and bring to 
market,81 for fear of financial ruin if the new product possesses unexpected 
problems.  For these and other reasons, while most courts in this context 
continue to apply “strict” liability by name to warning cases, the principles 
they in fact apply are nothing more than negligence.  The Third 
Restatement follows this approach in limiting a manufacturer’s warning 
responsibility in prescription drug cases to a duty to provide “reasonable 
instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm.”82 
B.  Regulation by the FDA 
Prescription drug litigation must be considered against the backdrop of 
the relatively strict regulation provided by the FDA.83  The FDA regulates 
both the safety and effectiveness of prescription pharmaceuticals and 
certain medical devices.84  In addition to ensuring that prescription drugs 
are safe and effective before they are sold in interstate commerce, the FDA 
approves all information a manufacturer plans to provide physicians on a 
drug’s recommended use, contraindications, risks, and side-effects.  
Underlying the regulatory scheme are two assumptions reflecting the 
special types of dangers that inhere in drugs classified as prescription 
pharmaceuticals.  First is the belief that the risks in many drugs are so 
complex and dangerous that the FDA must determine their safety and 
effectiveness before they can be marketed at all.  The second premise is 
that the potential risks of improperly using many drugs are so substantial as 
to require professional medical judgment and supervision by doctors and 
nurse practitioners, rendering such products available to consumers only 
through prescriptions written by such health professionals. 
The principal federal statute regulating the quality of drugs is the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, originally enacted by Congress in 
1938.85  The Act’s key provisions prohibit the sale of “any food, drug, 
                                                                                                                          
accompanied by warnings of its dangerous propensities that were either known or reasonably 
scientifically knowable at the time of distribution”). 
81 See supra note 38. 
82 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998). 
83 The FDA’s regulatory problems were previously noted.  See Gilhooley, Vioxx’s History, supra 
note 31, at 960–61.  Nevertheless, the FDA’s pre-marketing approval process for prescription drugs is 
rigorous, time-consuming, and expensive.  See supra note 38; see also Schwartz & Goldberg, supra 
note 14, at 145 (explaining that the FDA monitors more than 10,000 drugs on the market and receives 
more than 400,000 problem reports in a year). 
84 “Drugs” over which the FDA has authority are defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (2006) as 
“articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body.”  A “device” 
subject to regulation is defined in § 321(h)(3) as “an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, 
contrivance, . . . or other similar or related article [that] is intended to affect the structure or any 
function of the body.”  21 U.S.C. § 321(h)(3) (2006). 
85 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–392 (2006). 
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device, . . . or cosmetic that is adulterated or misbranded”86 and require 
FDA approval of all new drugs prior to marketing.87  The Act addresses 
warnings and instructions through its requirement that drug labels not be 
“misbranded.”88  The Act requires manufacturers to provide adequate 
information on the purpose, proper dosage, and possible dangers to 
consumers for over-the-counter (“OTC”) drugs,89 and to medical 
professionals for prescription drugs.  A prescription drug is one that, 
“because of its toxicity or other potentiality for harmful effect, or the 
method of its use, or the collateral measures necessary to its use,” is safe 
only when prescribed and used under the supervision of a licensed medical 
practitioner,90 and such drugs must be labeled accordingly.91  Labels for 
OTC drugs must state the drug’s active ingredients and “established 
name”;92 must contain information on dosages, duration of use, directions 
for use, and warnings against dangerous uses;93 and must describe the 
drug’s effectiveness, side-effects, and contraindications.94 
C.  Adequacy 
Principles of adequacy applicable to product warnings generally95 
apply as well to warnings required for prescription drugs, forming the 
center of a manufacturer’s duty to warn.  Liability for failing to warn is 
premised on a defendant’s failure to provide users and consumers adequate 
information about a product danger or how to avoid it.96  Many courts have 
stated what makes a warning “adequate.”  A frequently cited formulation 
of adequacy is from Pavlides v. Galveston Yacht Basin, Inc.,97 where the 
court explained that, to be adequate, a warning 
 
                                                                                                                          
86 Id. § 331(a). 
87 Id. § 355(a).  This requirement applies to “any new drug,” including over-the-counter drugs.  
See, e.g., id. § 321(g)(1) (defining the term “drug”). 
88 Id. §§ 352–353. 
89 The process by which a drug may be determined to be an OTC drug as opposed to a 
prescription drug is described in 21 C.F.R. § 330.10, which provides a detailed process for determining 
a drug’s safety and effectiveness that includes a benefit-to-risk ratio.  See 21 C.F.R. § 330.10(a)(4)(iii); 
see also 21 C.F.R § 330.10(a)(4)(vi) (“A drug shall be permitted for OTC sale and use by the laity 
unless, because of its toxicity or other potential for harmful effect or because of the method or 
collateral measures necessary to its use, it may safely be sold and used only under the supervision of a 
practitioner licensed by law to administer such drugs.”). 
90 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
91 Prescription drugs must bear labels stating, “CAUTION: Federal law prohibits dispensing 
without prescription,” and must provide any special directions for use and cautionary statements 
contained in the prescription.  See id. § 353(b)(2), (4). 
92 Id. § 352(e). 
93 Id. § 352(f). 
94 Id. § 352(n). 
95 See OWEN, supra note 14, § 9.3. 
96 See id., §§ 9.2–9.3. 
97 727 F.2d 330, 330, 338 (5th Cir. 1984). 
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must provide a complete disclosure of the existence and 
extent of the risk involved.  A warning must (1) be designed 
so it can reasonably be expected to catch the attention of the 
consumer; (2) be comprehensible and give a fair indication of 
the specific risks involved with the product; and (3) be of an 
intensity justified by the magnitude of the risk.98 
Another court aptly observed that a warning’s adequacy depends on a 
balance of many factors, including 
the severity of the danger; . . . the likelihood that the warning 
will catch the attention of those who will foreseeably use the 
product and convey the nature of the danger to them; . . . the 
intensity and form of the warning; . . . and the cost of 
improving the strength or mode of the warning.99 
The Third Restatement notes that determining a warning’s adequacy 
requires focusing on its “content and comprehensibility, intensity of 
expression, and the characteristics of expected user groups.”100 
More concisely, it might be said that to be adequate, a warning must 
provide a reasonable amount and type of information about a product’s 
material risks and how to avoid them in a manner calculated to reach and 
be understood by those likely to need the information.101  The adequacy of 
a warning is often bound up with the issue of who should be warned, so 
that a warning ordinarily will not be adequate unless it warns persons 
foreseeably threatened by a product hazard or others in the best position—
such as doctors—to act on warnings to protect persons subject to the 
hazard.102  Whether a manufacturer or other seller has provided sufficient 
information about a product’s hazards is especially fact intensive, such that 
                                                                                                                          
98 Id. at 338 (internal citations omitted). Other courts still rely on this formulation.  See, e.g., 
Lewis v. Sea Ray Boats, Inc., 65 P.3d 245, 248 (Nev. 2003) (holding that in order for a product 
warning to be ruled adequate, the warning “must (1) be designed so it can reasonably be expected to 
catch the attention of the consumer; (2) be comprehensible and give a fair indication of the specific 
risks involved with the product; and (3) be of an intensity justified by the magnitude of the risk” 
(internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
99 Bloxom v. Bloxom, 512 So. 2d 839, 844 (La. 1987) (internal citations omitted); see also Gray 
v. Badger Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2004) (“To be legally adequate, the warning 
should (1) attract the attention of those that the product could harm; (2) explain the mechanism and 
mode of injury; and (3) provide instructions on ways to safely use the product to avoid injury.”). 
100 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(c) cmt. i (1998). 
101 The first half of this formulation concerns the “substantive” adequacy of the warning’s 
informational content, and the latter half concerns the “procedural” adequacy of the form of its 
conveyance.  On this distinction, see OWEN, supra note 14, § 9.3. 
102 See Anderson v. Hedstrom Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 422, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (“The factual 
determination of whether an adequate warning was given is often interwoven with the question of 
whether the defendant manufacturer has a duty to warn, and if so, to whom that duty is owed.” 
(emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
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the adequacy of warnings and instructions normally, but not always,103 is a 
factual question for the jury to decide.104 
In the context of drug warnings, the manufacturer must convey all 
material information on possible risks to doctors, comprehensible to the 
general practitioner as well as to the specialist, or to consumers, 
comprehensible to them if the circumstances warrant.105  For a drug 
warning to be “adequate,” it must describe the scope of the danger;106 the 
effects of misuse, including the failure to follow instructions; and the 
physical aspects of the warning and broader method of conveyance must 
be likely to alert recipients to the danger.107  Other aspects of a drug 
warning’s adequacy include such matters as the effect of a manufacturer’s 
“overpromotion” of a drug’s safety108 and whether warnings should be 
                                                                                                                          
103 See Austin v. Will-Burt Co., 361 F.3d 862, 869 (5th Cir. 2004) (finding that a warning may be 
adequate as a matter of law when it specifically warns against the very risk that causes a plaintiff’s 
harm); Calhoun v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 768 So. 2d 57, 61 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that 
adequacy becomes a question of law when the warning is “accurate, clear, and unambiguous”); Martin 
v. Hacker, 628 N.E.2d 1308, 1312 (N.Y. 1993) (explaining that “whether a given warning is legally 
adequate or presents a factual question for a jury to decide requires a careful analysis of the warning’s 
language”); see also 2 LOUIS R. FRUMER & MELVIN I. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12.03[1][b] 
(2009) (noting that “[c]ourts frequently state that the adequacy of warnings is a question for the trier of 
fact”). 
104 See McNeil v. Wyeth, 462 F.3d 364, 368 (5th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that when a risk described 
on a drug label is low enough to induce a doctor to undertake the risk, the court could not rule that “no 
reasonable jury could conclude that a warning was inadequate”); Madsen v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 
477 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1035 (E.D. Mo. 2007) (explaining that in a prescription drug liability case: 
“[A]n adequate warning is one reasonable under the circumstances.  Specifically, the warning must:  
(1) indicate the scope of the danger; (2) communicate the extent or seriousness of the potential danger; 
(3) alert a reasonably prudent practitioner to the danger; and (4) be conveyed in a satisfactory 
manner.”). 
105 See Perez v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., 734 A.2d 1245, 1257 (N.J. 1999) (holding that a warning must 
include all material risks, meaning those to which a reasonable patient would attach significance in 
deciding whether to take the drug); Wagner v. Roche Labs., 671 N.E.2d 252, 256 (Ohio 1996) (finding 
that drug warnings were inadequate, meaning there was not a reasonable disclosure of “all risks 
inherent in the use of the drug of which the manufacturer, being held to the standards of an expert in the 
field, knew or should have known to exist”). 
106 See Madsen, 477 F. Supp. 2d at 1035; see also Thom v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 
848, 853 (10th Cir. 2003).  Compare Myers v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 170 P.3d 254, 262–65 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 2007) (refusing to hold Accutane warnings adequate as a matter of law under the learned 
intermediary doctrine on motion to dismiss), with Gerber v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 2d 
907, 917–19 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that the Accutane package insert adequately warned 
dermatologists of the risk of birth defects when prescribed for pregnant women). 
107 See OWEN, supra note 14, § 9.3. 
108 As with other types of products, risks in pharmaceuticals must not be unduly downplayed, nor 
safety “overpromoted”; instead, a manufacturer’s communications to doctors must present a reasonably 
balanced portrayal of the effectiveness and dangers of a drug.  See Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 196 F. Supp. 
2d 984, 998 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“An overpromotion theory is one way that a plaintiff in a failure-to-warn 
case can overcome the manufacturer’s argument either (1) that it provided adequate warnings or (2) 
that the doctor’s decision to prescribe a drug despite his awareness of its dangers was an intervening 
cause sufficient to vitiate the manufacturer’s liability.”), aff’d, 358 F.3d 659, 360–61 (9th Cir. 2004); 
see also Ebel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 536 F. Supp. 2d 767, 775–76 (S.D. Tex. 2008) (noting that while 
overpromotion can include promotion of off-label use not approved by the FDA, there was insufficient 
proof thereof); Madden, supra note 72, at 330 (“An otherwise suitable warning may be vitiated by the 
conduct of the manufacturer or those acting at [its direction] . . . if they promote the product in such a 
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made in foreign languages.109  The California Supreme Court addressed the 
latter issue in Ramirez v. Plough, Inc.,110 where an infant contracted Reye’s 
Syndrome after his Spanish-speaking mother gave him St. Joseph’s Aspirin 
for Children to relieve his cold symptoms.  The aspirin’s label warned of 
the Reye’s Syndrome risk in English but not in Spanish.  Although the 
FDA specifically permitted English-only labeling, the plaintiff claimed that 
the label’s failure to include a Spanish warning rendered it inadequate.  
The court reviewed a number of related factors: the web of rules on 
foreign-language labeling requirements in various other contexts adopted 
by the California legislature; the FDA’s quite specific rules governing 
foreign-language labeling that permitted, but did not require, such labeling; 
and the multiplicity of health, social, cost, and practicability factors.  
Considering all these factors, the court concluded that foreign-language 
labeling requirements were better determined by legislatures and 
regulatory agencies than by the courts.  Because other branches of 
government had determined that English-only warnings were sufficient, 
the court decided that it should apply the same rule to the case.111 
An example of the adequacy issue at play in a normal prescription drug 
case is Martin v. Hacker,112 in which a doctor treated the decedent, Mr. 
Martin, for hypertension (high blood pressure) with two drugs 
manufactured by the defendant, including Reserpine.  Mr. Martin became 
severely depressed and fatally shot himself in the head, allegedly because 
of the Reserpine.  The issue was whether the information provided by the 
manufacturer to physicians about the drug’s risks was adequate as a matter 
of law.  The package insert specified among the drug’s 
“CONTRAINDICATIONS,” “mental depression (especially with suicidal 
tendencies)”; and among its “WARNINGS,” the package insert stated: 
 
                                                                                                                          
fashion as to obscure or lessen the cautionary impact of the seller’s warnings.”); Janet Fairchild, 
Annotation, Promotional Efforts Directed Toward Prescribing Physician as Affecting Prescription 
Drug Manufacturer’s Liability for Product-Caused Injury, 94 A.L.R.3D 1080, 1080 (1979).  Compare 
Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 507 P.2d 653, 655–56 (Cal. 1973) (finding overpromotion of 
Chloromycetin, a broad-spectrum antibiotic, downplaying the risk of fatal aplastic anemia), with 
Spinden v. Johnson & Johnson, 427 A.2d 597, 599 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (holding that AMA 
Journal ads did not amount to overpromotion). 
109 See Christopher S. Maciejewski, The Dilemma Over Foreign-Language Labeling of Over-the-
Counter Drugs, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 129, 144–48 (1994). 
110 863 P.2d 167 (Cal. 1993). 
111 Id. at 169–70, 174–76.  Noting that the FDA stresses the importance of “uniformity in 
presentation and clarity of message,” the court concluded: 
To preserve that uniformity and clarity, to avoid adverse impacts upon the 
warning requirements mandated by the federal regulatory scheme, and in deference 
to the superior technical and procedural lawmaking resources of legislative and 
administrative bodies, we adopt the legislative/regulatory standard of care that 
mandates nonprescription drug package warnings in English only. 
Id. at 177. 
112 628 N.E.2d 1308 (N.Y. 1993). 
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Extreme caution should be exercised in treating patients with 
a history of mental depression.  Discontinue the drug at first 
sign of despondency, early morning insomnia, loss of 
appetite, impotence, or self-deprecation.  Drug-induced 
depression may persist for several months after drug 
withdrawal and may be severe enough to result in suicide.113 
Carefully applying a full list of adequacy factors, the court concluded 
that the warning was commensurate with the risk, including possible 
adverse consequences of use (death from suicide was specifically 
mentioned); the insert’s language was accurate, clear, direct, unequivocal, 
sufficiently forceful, complete, consistent, devoid of contradiction, and the 
information was current;114 and, when read as a whole, the meaning 
conveyed about the possible consequences of taking the drug was 
unmistakable.115  The court thus determined that the warnings were 
adequate as a matter of law.116 
A recurring adequacy issue, sometimes dubbed “procedural adequacy,” 
concerns the method by which the information is conveyed to the 
recipient.117  There are several standard avenues of communication 
between drug companies and physicians for transmitting information about 
drugs, and a manufacturer must select the best methods reasonably 
available to convey important new information on drug dangers to doctors 
who need the information.  The Physician’s Desk Reference (“PDR”), 
updated periodically, contains copies of package inserts for many 
prescription drugs.  Other sources of information that are more complete 
than the PDR are Facts and Comparisons (updated monthly), the annual 
United States Pharmacopeial Drug Information’s (“USP DI”) Vol. 1: Drug 
Information for the Health Care Professional, and Vol. 2: Advice for the 
Patient—Drug Information in Lay Language.  Information on warnings 
and contraindications is readily available to physicians from these 
reference works, and the warnings in package inserts and the PDR 
ordinarily are adequate to alert physicians to drug hazards. 
                                                                                                                          
113 Id. at 1309–10. 
114 To be adequate, a warning must be timely.  A long series of cases involving Aralen, a drug 
used in the treatment of rheumatoid arthritis and eventually linked to irreversible eye damage in some 
users, established certain principles.  To be timely, a warning of side-effects must be made promptly 
upon discovery of the coexistence of the side-effect and use of the drug, even though a causal 
relationship has not been clearly proved.  See Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 
1969); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 84–85 (8th Cir. 1966).  Since the drug company is 
held to have the knowledge of an expert, to be timely, a warning must be given as soon as the risks are 
pointed out in reputable scientific journals.  Schenebeck v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 423 F.2d 919, 921–23 
(8th Cir. 1970). 
115 Martin, 628 N.E.2d at 1312–15. 
116 Id. at 1315.  But in this context, as in others, adequacy usually is a factual issue for the jury.  
See, e.g., Anderson v. Hedstrom Corp., 76 F. Supp. 2d 422, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
117 OWEN, supra note 14, § 9.3. 
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New developments, however, may render information in the PDR 
obsolete, and a manufacturer’s failure promptly to update the medical 
profession may subject it to liability.  If information is critical, the 
manufacturer may need to send “Dear Doctor” letters advising physicians 
individually of the new information.118  The typically busy doctor, 
however, may not regularly consult the PDR or even routinely read “Dear 
Doctor” letters.  If the need to warn is compelling enough, reasonable care 
may require a drug company to use its salespersons who regularly call on 
doctors (“drug reps,” formerly called “detail men”) to warn them 
personally of a particular risk.119 
Unlike the controversial provision on design defects in prescription 
drugs discussed above,120 the Third Restatement defines a manufacturer’s 
responsibility for warning defects in prescription drugs in conventional 
negligence terms that give no cause to cavil.  In section 6(d), the Third 
Restatement provides, “A prescription drug or medical device is not 
reasonably safe due to inadequate instructions or warnings if reasonable 
instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of harm are not 
provided to” healthcare providers or patients, depending on the 
applicability of the learned intermediary doctrine,121 as discussed below.  
Principles of adequacy are embraced by the requirement that warnings and 
instructions be “reasonable,” and the limitation on responsibility to 
“foreseeable” risks reflects the now well-established principle, discussed 
above, that the law should not hold manufacturers of drugs or any other 
type of product responsible for harm that is unforeseeable or otherwise 
unavoidable under the prevailing state of the art, an important aspect of 
products liability law examined elsewhere in greater depth.122 
D.  The Law’s Duty Shield: Manufacturers 
1.  The Doctor in the Middle: The “Learned Intermediary Doctrine” 
In addition to the required pre-market approval by the FDA, a 
                                                                                                                          
118 As to the standards of adequacy for such letters, see Lawson v. G.D. Searle & Co., 356 N.E.2d 
779, 783–84 (Ill. 1976). 
119 For an early, leading case that examines factors bearing on whether a company must warn 
doctors in this manner, see Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978, 991–92 (8th Cir. 1969) 
(explaining that the failure to use detail men to alert doctors of possible eye damage was unreasonable 
in light of the fact that the PDR and “Dear Doctor” letters might not warn fast enough). 
The FDA now publishes and regularly updates comprehensive drug, biologic, medical device, and 
dietary supplement safety information on its MedWatch Safety Information and Adverse Event 
Reporting web site, available at http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/SAFETY.htm.  See, e.g., Stephen E. 
Scheve & Andrew E. Costa, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine After FDA’s Drug Watch and 
PhRMA’s Clinical Study Results Database, 73 DEF. COUNS. J. 12, 12 (2006) (analyzing the 
implications of two online databases that publish comprehensive drug safety information). 
120 See supra Part II. 
121 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998). 
122 See OWEN, supra note 14, § 10.3; Owen, Bending Nature, supra note 17. 
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prescription drug’s warnings and instructions must be provided to health 
professionals—doctors and nurse practitioners—rather than directly to 
patients.  Such “learned intermediaries” stand between the drug 
manufacturer and the patient, dispensing what medications and information 
they deem best.  Thus, the learned intermediary doctrine is an exception to 
the general rule that manufacturers must take all reasonable steps to 
provide warnings directly to a product’s ultimate user or consumer.123  
Under the learned intermediary doctrine, the prescription drug 
manufacturer’s duty to inform consumers runs only indirectly through 
physicians, rather than directly to consumers.124 
The basic rationale for the learned intermediary doctrine is quite 
powerful: medical professionals, and only medical professionals, have the 
requisite knowledge, training, and judgment to properly match particular 
drugs with distinctive benefits and dangers to particular patients with 
distinctive constitutions and medical conditions, and to properly monitor 
the results thereafter.  If manufacturers fulfill their obligations to provide 
full and fair information to healthcare professionals, those professionals 
should be able to make intelligent, reasonably safe, and effective treatment 
decisions.125  In turn, a prescribing doctor is obliged under the law of torts 
to inform the patient of a drug’s benefits and risks (as well as the benefits 
and risks of no treatment and alternative treatments), and to monitor how 
                                                                                                                          
123 See Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 836–37 (Conn. 2001). 
124 For contextual analysis of this doctrine, see Richard C. Ausness, Learned Intermediaries and 
Sophisticated Users: Encouraging the Use of Intermediaries To Transmit Product Safety Information, 
46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1185, 1195–96 (1996); Pamela R. Ferguson, Liability for Pharmaceutical 
Products: A Critique of the ‘Learned Intermediary’ Rule, 12 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 59, 66–68 
(1992); Richard B. Goetz & Karen R. Growdon, A Defense of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine, 63 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 421, 422 (2008); Jeffrey W. Kemp & Lindsy Nicole Alleman, The Bulk Supplier, 
Sophisticated User, and Learned Intermediary Doctrines Since the Adoption of the Restatement (Third) 
of Torts, 26 REV. LITIG. 927, 947 (2007); Nancy K. Plant, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Some 
New Medicine for an Old Ailment, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1007, 1007 (1996); Susan Poser, Unlabeled Drug 
Samples and the Learned Intermediary: The Case for Drug Company Liability Without Preemption, 62 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653, 656–58 (2007); Charles J. Walsh et al., The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: 
The Correct Prescription for Drug Labeling, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 821, 844 (1996); see also Chuang, 
supra note 72, at 1463–76; Jennifer Girod, Note, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine: An Efficient 
Protection for Patients, Past and Present, 40 IND. L. REV. 397, 397 (2007). 
125 Judge Wisdom well explained the doctrine’s rationale in Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories: 
Prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and 
varied in effect.  As a medical expert, the prescribing physician can take into 
account the propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his patient.  His 
is the task of weighing the benefits of any medication against its potential dangers.  
The choice he makes is an informed one, an individualized medical judgment 
bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative.  Pharmaceutical companies 
then, who must warn ultimate purchasers of dangers inherent in patent drugs sold 
over the counter, in selling prescription drugs are required to warn only the 
prescribing physician, who acts as a “learned intermediary” between manufacturer 
and consumer. 
498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974); see also Larkin v. Pfizer, Inc., 153 S.W.3d 758, 763–64 (Ky. 
2004). 
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the drug affects the patient.126 
Sprouting in the 1960s,127 and becoming firmly rooted in the early 
1970s,128 the learned intermediary doctrine is an established fixture in 
American products liability law, adopted now by courts in a large majority 
of states.129  It may well be that the foundations of this doctrine are 
weakening,130 but the rule was explicitly endorsed by the Third 
Restatement and appears quite firmly entrenched for now.131  Because the 
doctrine defines the scope of a pharmaceutical manufacturer’s duty to 
warn, application of the learned intermediary rule involves a question of 
law for the court, not a factual question of adequacy for a jury.132 
                                                                                                                          
126 See FRANK M. MCCLELLAN, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: LAW, TACTICS, AND ETHICS 189, 199 
(1994); see also DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS, LAW OF TORTS § 250 (2000); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., 
PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 32, at 189–93 (5th ed. 1984); George P. Smith, II, The Vagaries of 
Informed Consent, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 109, 112 (2004). 
127 See Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 130 (9th Cir. 1968); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. 
Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966) (“[T]he purchaser’s doctor is a learned intermediary between 
the purchaser and the manufacturer.  If the doctor is properly warned of the possibility of a side effect 
in some patients, and is advised of the symptoms normally accompanying the side effect, there is an 
excellent chance that injury to the patient can be avoided.”); Stottlemire v. Cawood, 213 F. Supp. 897, 
898–99 (D.D.C. 1963); see also Magee v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 322, 327–28 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1963) (“The rule seems settled that a person not reasonably expected to use the manufacturer’s drug (or 
product) is not one to whom the warranty runs, and that he who uses it in a manner contrary to adequate 
warnings given by the manufacturer is in the same status.”). 
128 See Reyes, 498 F.2d at 1276; Hoffman v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 485 F.2d 132, 142 (3d Cir. 
1973); Gravis v. Parke-Davis & Co., 502 S.W.2d 863, 870 (Tex. App. 1973) (“The entire system of 
drug distribution in America is set up so as to place the responsibility of distribution and use upon 
professional people.  The laws and regulations prevent prescription type drugs from being purchased by 
individuals without the advice, guidance and consent of licensed physicians and pharmacists.  These 
professionals are in the best position to evaluate the warnings put out by the drug industry.”); 
Incollingo v. Ewing, 282 A.2d 206, 220 (Pa. 1971). 
129 See, e.g., Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig. v. Abbott Labs., 447 F.3d 861, 867 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(“[T]he vast majority of jurisdictions—45 out of 50 states—apply the learned intermediary doctrine to 
product liability claims.”); Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 367 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2004) (“‘[T]he 
[learned intermediary] doctrine either applies or is recognized . . . in 48 states, the District of Columbia, 
and Puerto Rico.’”) (quoting In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 215 F. Supp. 2d 795, 806 
(E.D. Tex. 2002)); Thom v. Bristol–Myers Squibb Co., 353 F.3d 848, 852 (10th Cir. 2003) (stating that 
forty-four jurisdictions adhere to the doctrine (citing Vitanza v. Upjohn Co., 778 A.2d 829, 838 n.11 
(Conn. 2001)).  But see State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. v. Karl, 647 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 2007) 
(rejecting the doctrine and asserting that twenty-two state high courts have not adopted the doctrine).  A 
few states have adopted the doctrine by statute.  E.g., MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(c)(ii) (2009); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4 (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-5(c) (2009). 
130 See James Ottavio Castagnera & Richard Ryan Gerner, The Gradual Enfeeblement of the 
Learned Intermediary Rule and the Argument in Favor of Abandoning It Entirely, 36 TORT & INS. L.J. 
119, 120 (2000) (describing a weakening of the rule due to “(1) the rise in consumer awareness, (2) the 
complexity of pharmaceutical products, (3) the development of clinical pharmacies that bring their own 
special expertise to bear on consumer and patient choices, and (4) the reduced time spent by patients in 
doctors’ offices”). 
131 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998). 
132 See Vitanza, 778 A.2d at 840 (refusing to convert a claim—that a manufacturer, which 
provided adequate warnings of Ansaid’s risks to doctors, should have placed warnings on drug 
samples—into a factual question of adequacy for a jury). 
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2.  Exceptions to the Doctrine 
When prescription drugs are dispensed under circumstances where 
healthcare professionals foreseeably fail to render the type of 
individualized balancing of benefits and risks contemplated by the learned 
intermediary doctrine, drug manufacturers may have a duty to provide 
warnings directly to patients.  That is, when the rationale for the learned 
intermediary doctrine falls away, the general rule—requiring 
manufacturers to warn consumers directly—logically should return.  This 
commonsense principle has spawned the following three exceptions,133 
only the first of which has much support. 
The most established exception to the learned intermediary rule is for 
mass immunization programs where no health professional mediates 
information about drug risks for the benefit of the patient.134  Most courts 
confronted with the issue have thus refused to apply the learned 
intermediary rule to situations where patients are vaccinated in assembly-
line fashion, often by persons other than physicians, with no opportunity 
for individualized medical assessments.  When people line up like 
lemmings to receive a polio shot or flu vaccination at a school or other 
facility for mass distribution of a vaccine, the manufacturer must take all 
reasonable steps to ensure that each patient is directly provided warnings 
and instructions on risks the manufacturer should know the drug 
possesses.135  As an exception to the learned intermediary rule, which itself 
is an exception to the manufacturer’s general obligation to warn consumers 
directly, the mass immunization doctrine restores the manufacturer’s duty 
to provide warnings (by leaflets or posters) directly to recipients of the 
vaccine.  This true exception was applied in early cases to the polio 
                                                                                                                          
133 Some plaintiffs’ lawyers and scholars argue for additional exceptions to the learned 
intermediary doctrine, and courts occasionally assert, in dictum, the existence of one or more such 
exceptions.  See, e.g., Vitanza, 778 A.2d at 846–47 (listing six supposed exceptions, including 
“overpromoted drugs” and “drugs withdrawn from the market,” but rejecting plaintiff’s request for a 
prescription drug sample exception); In re Zyprexa Prod. Liab. Litig., 2009 WL 20004540 (E.D.N.Y. 
2009) (Weinstein, J.) (citing dubious authority for the existence, “[i]n unusual cases,” of the 
overpromotion exception); Susan Poser, Unlabeled Drug Samples and the Learned Intermediary: The 
Case for Drug Company Liability Without Preemption, 62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 653 (2007) (arguing for 
drug sample exception); Frank C. Woodside III & Margaret M. Maggio, The Learned Intermediary 
Doctrine: Is It Eroding?, 52 FED. LAW. 28, 31 (Nov./Dec. 2005) (noting that plaintiffs sometimes 
argue that overpromotion by detail reps undermines “the physician’s ability to act as an intermediary 
and insist that, in this context, drug manufacturers have a duty to warn consumers directly”).  To date, 
however, no courts appear to have formally adopted any exceptions other than the three discussed 
below. 
134 See Marc A. Franklin & Joseph E. Mais, Jr., Tort Law and Mass Immunization Programs: 
Lessons from the Polio and Flu Episodes, 65 CAL. L. REV. 754, 775 (1977) (questioning the usefulness 
of tort law in the mass immunization context). 
135 See Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1428, 1433–34 n.3 (8th Cir. 1984) (quoting the warning 
provided to patients regarding the Swine Flu vaccine, which noted possible side effects, including 
“fever, chills, headache, or muscle aches” and special precautions to be taken by those interested in 
receiving the vaccine, namely, “[c]hildren under a certain age should not routinely receive flu 
vaccine”). 
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vaccine,136 and later to the Swine Flu vaccine.137  Although a court has 
wavered here or there,138 there is every reason to believe that courts will 
continue to require direct warnings to consumers in similar instances of 
mass immunization programs. 
Another exception, sometimes mentioned, concerns birth control pills.  
In MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,139 the plaintiff suffered a 
stroke leaving her partially paralyzed after taking the defendant’s birth 
control pills for an extended period of time, during which she had seen her 
physician once each year.  The manufacturer provided information to 
consumers via a package insert that included a warning of the risks of 
blood clots but that did not specifically mention the possibility of strokes.  
After suffering a stroke, the plaintiff claimed that the manufacturer had a 
duty to provide full and adequate warnings directly to her, the patient, and 
not just to doctors.  Although all but one of the fifteen prior reported 
judicial opinions had applied the learned intermediary doctrine to birth 
control pills, like other prescription drugs,140 the MacDonald majority 
reinstated a jury verdict for the plaintiff, reasoning that oral contraceptives 
stand apart from other types of prescription medications because of the 
heightened participation of patients in decisions relating to 
use of “the pill”; the substantial risks affiliated with the 
product’s use; the feasibility of direct warnings by the 
manufacturer to the user; the limited participation of the 
physician (annual prescriptions); and the possibility that oral 
communications between physicians and consumers may be 
insufficient or too scanty standing alone fully to apprise 
consumers of the product’s dangers at the time the initial 
selection of a contraceptive method is made as well as at 
subsequent points when alternative methods may be 
                                                                                                                          
136 See Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341, 1345–46 (5th Cir. 1977); Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 
F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974) (“[T]he manufacturer of a prescription drug who knows or has reason 
to know that it will not be dispensed as such a drug must provide the consumer with adequate 
information so that he can balance the risks and benefits of a given medication himself.”); Davis v. 
Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 131 (9th Cir. 1968). 
137 See Brazzell v. United States, 788 F.2d 1352, 1358 (8th Cir. 1986) (“The only warning 
appellee was given . . . in no way warned of the possibility of prolonged, debilitating muscle pain.”); 
Petty, 740 F.2d at 1437, 1440 (finding the given warning insufficient and affirming that the 
manufacturer has a duty to warn “the ultimate consumer in a mass-immunization case”). 
138 Compare Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc., 964 F.2d 1348, 1350–51 (3d Cir. 1992) (concluding 
that the measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine maker satisfied its duty by providing information to the 
Center for Disease Control), with Allison v. Merck & Co., Inc., 878 P.2d 948, 958–59 (Nev. 1994) 
(holding that the manufacturer of a vaccine for measles, mumps, and rubella could not delegate its duty 
to warn to the CDC whose information sheet made no mention of risks of blindness, deafness, and 
brain damage). 
139 475 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1985). 
140 Id. at 65–68, 73. 
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considered.141 
For these reasons, the court concluded that the learned intermediary 
doctrine should not apply to birth control pill manufacturers who therefore 
must provide warnings directly to ultimate users on the nature, gravity, and 
likelihood of foreseeable side-effects, and who must advise consumers to 
ask their doctors about any other matters about which they may be 
concerned.142  The dissenting Justice, observing that manufacturers of 
prescription pharmaceuticals have a duty to provide full information on all 
material risks to prescribing physicians who, in turn, have a duty (under the 
informed consent doctrine, redressable in a malpractice action) to provide 
full information on all material risks to patients for whom they prescribe 
the drug, argued that this traditional division of responsibility best allocates 
risks and responsibilities among the parties.143  While MacDonald is 
frequently cited as creating a new common law exception to the learned 
intermediary rule for birth control pills, only a small number of federal 
judges followed it, whereas other courts have uniformly rejected it and 
continue to apply the learned intermediary doctrine to birth control pills as 
other types of prescription pharmaceuticals.144 
                                                                                                                          
141 Id. at 70. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 74 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor wrote: 
The rules place on drug manufacturers the duty to gather, compile, and provide to 
doctors data regarding the use of their drugs, tasks for which the manufacturers are 
best suited, and the rules place on doctors the burden of conveying those data to 
their patients in a useful and understandable manner, a task for which doctors are 
best suited.  Doctors, unlike printed warnings, can tailor to the needs and abilities of 
an individual patient the information that that patient needs in order to make an 
informed decision whether to use a particular drug.  Manufacturers are not in a 
position to give adequate advice directly to those consumers whose medical histories 
and physical conditions, perhaps unknown to the consumers, make them peculiarly 
susceptible to risk.  Prescription drugs—including oral contraceptives—differ from 
other products because their dangers vary widely depending on characteristics of 
individual consumers. 
Id. 
144 See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 955 F. Supp. 700, 704 (E.D. Tex. 1997) 
(indicating that “[o]nly a single jurisdiction, Massachusetts, recognizes an exception to the doctrine for 
prescription contraceptives”).  Note, however, that an FDA regulation requires birth control 
manufacturers to provide warnings of dangers in lay language directly to users.  See Patient Package 
Inserts for Oral Contraceptives, 21 C.F.R. § 310.501 (2009).  This means that a negligence per se action 
may be available against such a manufacturer who fails to provide adequate risk information directly to 
users.  But the violation-of-regulation approach was explicitly rejected in Martin v. Ortho 
Pharmaceuticals, Corp., 661 N.E.2d 352, 353, 355–57 (Ill. 1996) (concerning the risk of birth limb 
reductions from pills used in the first trimester of pregnancy). 
Consider also that the MacDonald exception might create an “over-warning” problem for birth 
control pills, detrimental to most women’s health.  A Gallup poll in 1985 showed that “Americans 
greatly overestimate the risks and understate the effectiveness of birth control methods, particularly the 
pill, leaving them vulnerable to unintended pregnancies.”  According to the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, unwanted pregnancies and more than a million abortions each year 
needlessly threaten women’s lives.  “The society’s survey found that people are particularly 
misinformed about the birth control pill, which the group said is the most effective and safest 
contraceptive for many women.”  Three quarters of the women surveyed thought that the pill presents 
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A third exception, developed more recently, arose in response to 
direct-to-consumer advertising.  It may be that the learned intermediary 
doctrine is out of touch with how modern medicine is practiced in a world 
where prescription drug manufacturers jump over health professionals to 
consumers via television and other mass advertising.145  In Perez v. Wyeth 
Laboratories,146 the plaintiffs experienced problems after being implanted 
with the Norplant contraceptive device.  The plaintiffs sued Wyeth, which 
had properly warned doctors of possible complications, for failing to 
provide warnings directly to patients.  The trial court granted summary 
judgment for the manufacturer, based on the learned intermediary doctrine 
as incorporated in a New Jersey statute, and the appellate division 
affirmed.  In an important opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
reversed, ruling that the learned intermediary doctrine should no longer 
insulate prescription drug manufacturers from their duty to warn 
consumers directly when they seek to influence a patient’s choice of drugs 
through mass-marketing.147 
The Perez court reasoned that the learned intermediary doctrine is 
based on outmoded images of health care from a time when doctors gave 
medical advice in their offices, made house calls on request, charged only 
small sums for their advice, and prescribed medicines compounded by a 
neighborhood pharmacist—all at a time when “the prevailing attitude of 
                                                                                                                          
substantial health risks, despite the fact that the risk of death from taking the pill is about half the 
mother’s risk of death from childbirth.  Pill Poll—National Survey Finds Many Have Bad Information, 
STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Mar. 6, 1985, at 2A. 
145 See Richard C. Ausness, Will More Aggressive Marketing Practices Lead to Greater Tort 
Liability for Prescription Drug Manufacturers?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 97, 139 (2002); William A. 
Dreier, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising Liability: An Empty Gift to Plaintiffs, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 
806, 825 (2000); Timothy S. Hall, Regulating Direct-to-Consumer Advertising with Tort Law: Is the 
Law Finally Catching Up with the Market?, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 333, 348–52 (2009) [hereinafter 
Hall, Regulating Consumer Advertising]; Timothy S. Hall, The Promise and Peril of Direct-to-
Consumer Prescription Drug Promotion on the Internet, 7 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 40–41 
(2003) [hereinafter Hall, DTC Prescription Drug Promotion]; Justin L. Heather, Liability for Direct-to-
Consumer Advertising and Drug Information on the Internet, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 412, 420 (2001); 
Bradford B. Lear, The Learned Intermediary Doctrine in the Age of Direct Consumer Advertising, 65 
MO. L. REV. 1101, 1116–17 (2000); Lars Noah, Advertising Prescription Drugs to Consumers: 
Assessing the Regulatory and Liability Issues, 32 GA. L. REV. 141, 180 (1997); Scheve & Costa, supra 
note 119, at 21; Teresa M. Schwartz, Consumer-Directed Prescription Drug Advertising and the 
Learned Intermediary Rule, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 829, 848 (1991); Victor E. Schwartz et al., 
Marketing Pharmaceutical Products in the Twenty-First Century: An Analysis of the Continued 
Viability of Traditional Principles of Law in the Age of Direct-to-Consumer Advertising, 32 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 333, 387 (2009); Paul F. Strain & Christina L. Gaarder, Direct-to-Consumer Advertising 
and the Learned Intermediary Doctrine: Unsettling a Settled Question, 30 U. BALT. L. REV. 377, 382, 
387 (2001); Barbara J. Tyler & Robert A. Cooper, Blinded by the Hype: Shifting the Burden When 
Manufacturers Engage in Direct to Consumer Advertising of Prescription Drugs, 21 VT. L. REV. 1073, 
1105 (1997); Jeffrey J. Wiseman, Note, Another Factor in the “Decisional Calculus”: The Learned 
Intermediary Doctrine, the Physician-Patient Relationship, and Direct-to-Consumer Marketing, 52 
S.C. L. REV. 993, 1016–17 (2001). 
146 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999). 
147 Id. at 1247–49, 1264 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-4). 
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law and medicine was that the ‘doctor knows best.’”148  Sadly, this picture 
is radically different from the healthcare world that presently exists.  
Today, managed healthcare organizations are mammoth businesses, 
dispensing medical care and prescriptions impersonally, and medicines are 
sold in supermarket pharmacy departments and “often paid for by third-
party providers.”149  Against this backdrop, modern manufacturers of 
prescription drugs mass-market their wares directly “to consumers on the 
radio, television, the Internet, billboards on public transportation, and in 
magazines.”150  The court observed that problems in these advertising 
practices are manifest, permitting manufacturers and advertisers to 
manipulate information on safety and effectiveness that, at best, presents a 
diluted picture of a product’s risks.151 
Since Perez, several other courts have reconsidered the learned 
intermediary doctrine in light of direct-to-consumer advertising, the sale of 
prescription pharmaceuticals over the Internet from abroad, and the general 
depersonalization of healthcare delivery in the modern world.  For eight 
years, all courts considering the issue rejected Perez and continued to 
apply the learned intermediary doctrine.152  But in 2007, the West Virginia 
Supreme Court of Appeals, as a matter of first impression, refused to adopt 
the learned intermediary doctrine in State ex rel. Johnson & Johnson Corp. 
v. Karl.153  While acknowledging that most states have adopted the 
doctrine, and that many lower court decisions have applied it, the majority 
opinion lists twenty-one states whose high courts have not adopted this 
special drug exception to the ordinary duty of manufacturers to provide 
warnings directly to consumers.154  Agreeing with Perez that the learned 
intermediary doctrine is outmoded in the modern medical world, the Karl 
majority held that “manufacturers of prescription drugs are subject to the 
same duty to warn consumers about the risks of their products as other 
                                                                                                                          
148 Id. at 1246–47 (quoting Logan v. Greenwich Hosp. Ass’n, 465 A.2d 294, 299 (Conn. 1983)). 
149 Id. at 1247. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 1252–53 (citing Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: 
Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1456 (1999)). 
152 See, e.g., In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Liab. Litig., 165 F.3d 374, 380 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(finding that the learned intermediary doctrine applies); Beale v. Biomet, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 
1376–77 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (declining to adopt an exception to the learned intermediary doctrine); 
Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514, 547 n.30 (E.D. Pa. 2006) (stating that no state has 
followed New Jersey’s exception and that, unless the law changes, Pennsylvania also does not have 
such an exception), aff’d, 521 F.3d 253, 276 (3d Cir. 2008); In re Meridia Prods. Liab. Litig., 328 F. 
Supp. 2d 791, 812 n.19 (N.D. Ohio 2004) (stating that “[t]he Court . . . could not apply Perez’s logic 
even if it desired to do so,” and if it did, the plaintiffs still would not succeed), aff’d, 447 F.3d 861 (6th 
Cir. 2006). 
153 647 S.E.2d 899, 900–01 (W. Va. 2007). 
154 The court lists Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  Id. at 905. 
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manufacturers.”155  Concurring, Justice Maynard observed that “[p]atients 
can read the labels, instructions and warnings, and if the manufacturer 
makes them clear enough, then patients can be proactive in working with 
their doctors to receive the best care.”156 
Now that Perez is accompanied by Karl, it may well be that other 
jurisdictions will begin to rethink the logic of applying a rigid, paternalistic 
doctrine that developed under very different circumstances than exist 
today.157  But two decisions do not make a trend, and it is still too early to 
know when other courts may begin to recognize the wisdom of broadening 
the duty of pharmaceutical manufacturers to share vital information about 
drug risks directly with consumers.  In the meantime, it should be noted 
that only one of the three exceptions to the learned intermediary rule, the 
exception for mass immunization programs, is generally accepted, and it is 
even applied infrequently.158  While the Third Restatement adopts the 
learned intermediary rule, it provides a general exception wide enough to 
accommodate all three exceptions,159 and it specifically leaves open the 
question of whether a new exception should be created for drugs that are 
mass-marketed directly to consumers.160 
E.  The Law’s Duty Shield: Pharmacists 
Pharmacists dispense millions of drug prescriptions in America each 
day.161  While doctors prescribe pharmaceutical drugs, they typically know 
much less about such drugs (which they normally study for only one to 
three semesters) than pharmacists who study all aspects of drug therapy for 
five to seven years.162  For whatever reasons, many doctors order 
inappropriate prescription drugs for their patients, causing numerous 
patients to suffer adverse drug reactions—many of which could easily be 
prevented if patients received adequate drug warnings, which often they do 
                                                                                                                          
155 Id. at 914. 
156 Id. at 917, 919 (Maynard, J., concurring). 
157 See Rimbert v. Eli Lilly & Co., 577 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1219 (D.N.M. 2008) (predicting that 
New Mexico would not adopt the learned intermediary doctrine:  “There is nothing inconsistent with a 
patient relying on his or her doctor, and reading warning labels.  The informed consumer is likely to 
ask the physician more questions, and informed responses may increase reliance rather than decrease 
reliance.  The warnings may make the relationship more dynamic rather than one-sided.”). 
158 See Mazur v. Merck & Co., 742 F. Supp. 239, 253 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (noting that “[a]ll of the 
vaccine cases recognize the theoretical validity of the ‘mass immunization exception’ to the learned 
intermediary rule, but very few have found situations where its application is warranted”). 
159 The Third Restatement provides that a prescription drug or medical device is defective if the 
manufacturer fails to provide reasonable warnings of foreseeable risks to: (1) the doctor or other 
healthcare provider, or (2) the patient, if the manufacturer should know that healthcare providers are 
“not in a position to reduce the risks of harm in accordance with the instructions or warnings.”  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(d) (1998). 
160 Id. at cmt. e. 
161 See Steven W. Huang, The Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990: Redefining Pharmacists’ 
Legal Responsibilities, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 417, 418 (1998). 
162 See id. at 440–41. 
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not.  Studies show that a large proportion of drug prescriptions contain 
errors that result in adverse drug events,163 and that most persons are 
inadequately warned, either by their doctors or pharmacists, of drug 
interactions and other hazards of prescription drugs.164  These facts suggest 
that pharmacists should have a duty of reasonable care to warn patients of 
hazards in prescription drugs.165 
Because pharmacists are more in the nature of service providers, like 
doctors, than retail merchants, like hatters, they are subject to liability for 
selling prescription drugs only in negligence, not strict liability.166  In 
filling prescriptions, pharmacists are held to the highest standard of care, 
such that a pharmacist who makes a mistake in filling a prescription is 
almost certainly responsible for any resulting harm.167  But pharmacists 
long have been held to have no duty, apart from not misrepresenting facts 
about a drug,168 other than to dispense drugs accurately according to the 
terms of a valid prescription.169  In particular, pharmacists simply have no 
general duty to warn patients—not even to pass along package inserts 
(intended for physicians) containing detailed warnings—of hazards or side-
                                                                                                                          
163 See, e.g., Michele L. Hornish, Just What the Doctor Ordered—Or Was It?: Missouri 
Pharmacists’ Duty of Care in the 21st Century, 65 MO. L. REV. 1075, 1076 (2000) (“[C]ourts have 
begun to recognize that pharmacists are the last chance that the system has to correct itself, and that 
pharmacists are experts in pharmaceutical science and should be treated as professionals.”). 
164 See Huang, supra note 161, at 419 (citing a survey that found that only forty-four percent of 
the respondents reported that their pharmacists warned them about drug interactions). 
165 See Kenneth R. Baker, The OBRA 90 Mandate and Its Developing Impact on the Pharmacist’s 
Standard of Care, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 503, 518 (1996); David B. Brushwood, The Pharmacist’s Duty 
Under OBRA-90 Standards, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 475, 494–97 (1997). 
166 See Parker v. St. Vincent Hosp., 919 P.2d 1104, 1106, 1112 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996); Madison v. 
Am. Home Prods. Corp., 595 S.E.2d 493, 494, 496 (S.C. 2004); Pittman v. Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 
425, 435 (Tenn. 1994); Schaerrer v. Stewart’s Plaza Pharmacy, Inc., 79 P.3d 922, 933 (Utah 2003); see 
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 6(e) (1998); Timothy E. Travers, 
Annotation, Druggist’s Civil Liability for Injuries Sustained as Result of Negligence in Incorrectly 
Filling Drug Prescriptions, 3 A.L.R.4TH 270, 276 (1981).  But see Heredia v. Johnson, 827 F. Supp. 
1522, 1525 (D. Nev. 1993) (denying the defendant’s motion for summary judgment with regard to the 
claim of strict liability); Griffith v. Blatt, 51 P.3d 1256, 1262 (Or. 2002) (finding that a pharmacist who 
sold prescription lotion was a “seller” under section 402A and, hence, possibly subject to strict liability 
in tort for failing to warn). 
167 See, e.g., Marston v. Walgreen Co., 907 N.E.2d 851, 854 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009) (providing an 
example of filling a prescription for allopurinol with glipizide pills); Troppi v. Scarf, 187 N.W.2d 511, 
513 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (finding negligence in filling a prescription for birth control pills with a 
tranquilizer, which resulted in an unwanted child); Burke v. Bean, 363 S.W.2d 366, 366–68 (Tex. App. 
1962) (addressing the sale of Oxsoralen capsules when Oxacholin tablets were prescribed). 
168 See, e.g., Rite Aid Corp. v. Levy-Gray, 894 A.2d 563, 579 (Md. 2006) (holding that the 
learned intermediary doctrine does not protect a pharmacy from breach of express warranty claims for 
incorrectly stating that a drug could be taken with food or milk if it upset the client’s stomach). 
169 See, e.g., Kampe v. Howard Stark Prof’l Pharmacy, Inc., 841 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1992) (ruling that properly filling legal prescription fulfills the pharmacist’s duty), abrogated by 
Horner v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (rejecting “the suggestion in Kampe that the 
only functions which a pharmacist must perform to fulfill his duty is to dispense drugs according to a 
physician’s prescription”); see also Huang, supra note 161, at 417–18 (explaining that the law clearly 
provides that a pharmacist has a duty to properly dispense drugs, but that the law is ambiguous as to 
any further duty). 
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effects in prescription drugs that they dispense.170  The pharmacist’s 
immunity from a general duty to warn patients has been justified on a 
number of grounds, including the learned intermediary doctrine’s 
placement of warning responsibilities solely on doctors and nurse 
practitioners who theoretically are aware of a patient’s treatment needs as 
well as the benefits and dangers of particular prescription drugs;171 the 
burdens on pharmacists of having to second-guess decisions of prescribing 
doctors; the confusion of patients receiving conflicting information from 
their doctors and pharmacists; and an assumption that doctors are simply 
better skilled than pharmacists at evaluating the possible consequences of 
prescription medications.172 
But cracks are beginning to appear in the pharmacist’s general 
immunity from a duty to warn, reflecting legislative requirements that 
pharmacists monitor and counsel their clients about prescription drugs,173 a 
development that has stimulated increased education and professionalism 
in this field.174  In a number of cases, courts have held that pharmacists 
may have a duty of reasonable care to warn in certain circumstances.  First, 
pharmacists are subject to liability in negligence for failing to recognize a 
                                                                                                                          
170 See In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 133 F. Supp. 2d 272, 279, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(discussing numerous cases concerning diabetes medication and finding that there was no general duty 
to warn in Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Texas, or West Virginia); Deed v. Walgreen Co., 927 A.2d 
1001, 1002–04 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) (finding that a pharmacy had no duty to warn when a customer 
died from acute toxicity resulting from 149 prescriptions filled according to physician directions in the 
year prior to her death); Pysz v. Henry’s Drug Store, 457 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) 
(holding that it was the doctor’s responsibility, not the pharmacist’s, to warn plaintiff of addiction risk 
in Quaaludes dispensed for more than nine years); Frye v. Medicare–Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557, 
561 (Ill. 1992) (finding no duty to warn of the drug’s interactions); Stebbins v. Concord Wrigley 
Drugs, Inc., 416 N.W.2d 381, 385, 387–88 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (finding no duty to warn of 
drowsiness that caused car accident); Moore v. Mem’l Hosp. of Gulfport, 825 So. 2d 658, 661 (Miss. 
2002) (ruling that a pharmacist was not liable for failing to warn a pregnant woman that Diovan was 
contraindicated for pregnancy where her child suffered kidney failure as a result); Laws v. Johnson, 
799 S.W.2d 249, 253 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (finding no liability for removing a package insert that 
warned of risk of heart attack); Schaerrer, 79 P.3d at 925 (holding that a pharmacist who compounded 
and sold Phen-fen without warning of risks was not liable for negligence); McKee v. Am. Home Prods. 
Corp., 782 P.2d 1045, 1046–47 (Wash. 1989) (providing an example where pharmacists refilled 
potentially addictive amphetamine, prescribed as an appetite suppressant, for ten years without warning 
of addiction risk or passing on drug insert that warned about it). 
171 See Springhill Hosps., Inc. v. Larrimore, 5 So. 3d 513, 521 (Ala. 2008) (applying the learned 
intermediary doctrine to bar pharmacist liability for alleged negligence in filling a prescription that led 
to the death of a patient). 
172 See Moore v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., 236 F. Supp. 2d 509, 512–13 (D. Md. 2002) (“[I]t is unwise 
to impose liability on a pharmacist for filling a prescription signed by the physician, because the 
physician is in a better position to evaluate the patient’s medical needs.”); Chamblin v. K-Mart Corp., 
612 S.E.2d 25, 27 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that the learned intermediary rule properly shields 
pharmacists from duty to warn of drug side-effects); Moore, 825 So. 2d at 666 (finding that the learned 
intermediary doctrine protects pharmacists); Morgan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455, 469 
(Tex. App. 2000) (concluding that the general no-duty rule should be retained); Schaerrer, 79 P.3d at 
929 (noting that information may confuse consumers). 
173 See, e.g., McKee v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 964 So. 2d 1008, 1011 (La. Ct. App. 2007); Huang, 
supra note 161, at 433–34. 
174 See Huang, supra note 161, at 440. 
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clear and obvious error present on the face of a prescription.175  So, if a 
prescription fails to state a medication’s maximum dosage, it is patently 
defective on its face, and a pharmacist may be subject to liability in 
negligence for failing to check with the prescribing physician or inform the 
patient of this important dosage fact.176  Further, a pharmacist may have a 
duty to warn a customer or contact the physician if the pharmacist knows a 
drug is contraindicated for the customer, as when a pharmacist knows a 
customer is an alcoholic,177 has an allergy,178 or is taking another, 
incompatible drug.179  In addition, if a pharmacist undertakes to collect 
data on a client’s allergies,180 to monitor its client’s prescriptions for drug 
interactions,181 or, perhaps, to warn of side-effects,182 it normally will be 
bound to perform that undertaking with reasonable care.183  In these and 
other situations where a pharmacist has special knowledge of a risk to a 
particular client, courts have sometimes broken through the traditional 
immunity and held pharmacists to a duty of reasonable care to warn of the 
risk of addiction,184 potential drug interactions,185 and other adverse effects 
                                                                                                                          
175 See Downing v. Hyland Pharmacy, 194 P.3d 944, 949 (Utah 2008) (holding that the learned 
intermediary doctrine does not exempt a pharmacy from liability for filling a prescription for drugs 
withdrawn from the market by the FDA). 
176 See Horner v. Spalitto, 1 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (finding that a jury could 
conclude that the pharmacist failed to fulfill his duty by not informing the prescribing physician that he 
was prescribing the medication at a significantly higher dose than recommended); Riff v. Morgan 
Pharmacy, 508 A.2d 1247, 1249–50, 1253 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding that the pharmacy failed to 
fulfill its duty by not supplementing inadequate instructions on a prescription). 
177 See Hand v. Krakowski, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122–23 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982). 
178 See Happel v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 766 N.E.2d 1118, 1124 (Ill. 2002) (ruling that a 
pharmacy, because it undertook to compile plaintiff’s allergies, had superior knowledge and a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to warn of foreseeable risk of allergic reaction). 
179 See Brienze v. Casserly, No. 01-1655-C, 2003 WL 23018810, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 
2003); cf. Powers v. Thobhani, 903 So. 2d 275, 277, 280 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (reversing summary 
judgment for a pharmacy in a case where the patient died from an overdose of OxyCodone and many 
other prescription narcotics for neck and back pain that the pharmacy repeatedly filled too closely in 
time). 
180 See Happel, 766 N.E.2d at 1121, 1124. 
181 See Baker v. Arbor Drugs, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 727, 729, 731 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996) 
(“[D]efendant voluntarily assumed a duty of care when it implemented the Arbortech Plus system and 
then advertised that this system would detect harmful drug interactions for its customers.”). 
182 See In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 1355, 2002 WL 1446714, at *4 (E.D. La. 
July 2, 2002) (denying summary judgment when a pharmacy allegedly misrepresented the side-effects 
to a customer); Cottam v. CVS Pharmacy, 764 N.E.2d 814, 818–19, 823 (Mass. 2002) (holding that by 
providing a partial list of side-effects, reasonable care might require including impotency).  Contra 
Kasin v. Osco Drug, Inc., 728 N.E.2d 77, 81 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (finding that by listing some side-
effects, pharmacy did not have duty to list them all). 
183 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 43 
(2010) (explaining liability for harm from negligent undertakings that increase risk or on which 
plaintiff relies). 
184 See Lasley v. Shrake’s Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129, 1134 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1994); Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 520–21 (Ind. 1994). 
185 See Baker, 544 N.W.2d at 732–33 (finding that a pharmacist assumed a duty to warn by 
advertising that its computerized drug detection system identified and prevented drug interactions); 
Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380, 382, 386 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990) (determining that a disputed issue 
of fact exists whether pharmacy had a duty to warn of potential drug interactions). 
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of prescription drugs.186 
How far these small cracks in the pharmacist’s no-duty-to-warn wall 
eventually may propagate is impossible to say, and there clearly is no 
stampede to break down the pharmacist’s virtual immunity from a warning 
obligation.187  Yet, the pharmacy profession is changing in ways that 
suggest that these strategically positioned experts in prescription 
pharmaceuticals might properly be required to bear a greater responsibility 
for warning patients of the hazards of such medications. 
V.  REFORMING PRIVATE DRUG LAW TO IMPROVE THE PUBLIC HEALTH 
Responsibility in private law for drug dangers has evolved reasonably 
over time, but it needs to be reformed.  The major problem generating a 
need for reform is that the law on medical malpractice, federal preemption, 
and a variety of products liability law principles developed separately, 
under discrete doctrinal umbrellas, rather than together within a holistic 
public health perspective.  That is, private law duties on drug designs and 
warnings have evolved with an insular tort law focus on how litigation has 
been thought to promote drug safety and on whom most fairly, in terms of 
fault, responsibility for drug injuries should be placed.  Such conventional 
tort law perspectives surely are fundamentally sound, yet they are 
grounded in archaic visions of the evolving roles and relationships of the 
affected groups—drug manufacturers, doctors, pharmacists, and patients.  
Largely overlooked by the tort law litigation system—whose general 
principles of reparative justice evolve narrowly, slowly, and incrementally 
under the common law—are vital goals of the nation’s public health 
system: consumer choice, quality health care, and cost containment.188 
This section explores how private law might consider reforming three 
principles of products liability law with respect to dangerous prescription 
drugs: (1) the liability of prescription drug manufacturers for design 
defects; (2) the limited duty of prescription drug manufacturers to provide 
warnings only to healthcare providers, not directly to consumers; and (3) 
the absence of a duty of pharmacists to provide warnings to consumers.  In 
examining the evolution of these principles of drug products liability law, 
this Article has revealed their respective weaknesses.  For reasons explored 
                                                                                                                          
186 See Guillory v. Dr. X, 679 So. 2d 1004, 1010 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that a pharmacist 
has a duty to fill a prescription correctly and to warn the patient or to notify the prescribing physician of 
an excessive dosage or of obvious inadequacies on the face of the prescription); see also Pittman v. 
Upjohn Co., 890 S.W.2d 425, 435 (Tenn. 1994) (finding that the duty to warn did not extend to 
patient’s third-party relative). 
187 See Deed v. Walgreen Co., 927 A.2d 1001, 1004 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007) (holding that, under 
the learned intermediary doctrine, a pharmacist has no duty to warn customers); Morgan v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 30 S.W.3d 455, 467 (Tex. App. 2000) (providing a thorough review of a pharmacist’s duty 
to warn and concluding that the general, no-duty rule should be retained). 
188 Broad, even universal, insurance coverage is another important healthcare goal, but it is largely 
unrelated to private law. 
 772 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:733 
above, it is here proposed that prescription drug manufacturers be 
exempted from private law responsibility for design defects, and that 
manufacturers and pharmacists both be required to exercise reasonable care 
in warning and instructing consumers on prescription drug dangers and 
how to avoid them.  This section sketches out how each of these reforms 
appears consistent with three principal goals of healthcare reform: 
maximizing consumer choice, improving healthcare quality, and 
containing costs.  The preliminary analysis here is intended as a start to 
deeper inquiry into these and other private law reforms that may help 
resolve the healthcare crisis. 
A.  Choice 
Choice, a vital ingredient of human freedom, allows persons to 
exercise autonomy in making important decisions about their lives.189  The 
design of a healthcare system in a free society thus should promote 
consumer choice as much as practicable.  With respect to prescription 
drugs, this means making useful information meaningfully available to 
patients (as well as to their professional healthcare advisers) so that 
patients can make genuinely informed decisions, guided by their doctors, 
on which drugs (if any) to take to treat their particular conditions.190  
Focusing on this objective reveals a number of shortcomings in current 
principles of private drug law addressed by these three reforms. 
1.  Ban Liability for Defective Design 
The first reform proposal is to ban claims against drug manufacturers 
for defective design, a type of claim that a number of courts have allowed 
over the last couple of decades.191  Courts that have allowed such claims, 
drawing from conventional tort law rationales, often reason that drug 
manufacturers should be subject to design defect claims to enhance the 
safety of drugs and provide compensatory relief to persons injured by 
drugs designed in an unnecessarily dangerous manner.192  Yet, narrowly 
                                                                                                                          
189 See David G. Owen, Philosophical Foundations of Fault in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 201, 209 (David G. Owen ed., 1995) (“Autonomy entails the notion that a 
person may—indeed, must—make choices and then act upon those choices.”); Owen, Figuring 
Foreseeability, supra note 79 (explaining the relationship between autonomy and choice). 
190 See Oonagh Corrigan, Empty Ethics: The Problem with Informed Consent, 25 SOC. HEALTH & 
ILLNESS 768, 769–70 (2003) (noting that the underpinning of informed consent is that it will protect the 
autonomy of patients in making free and informed choices); Jessica J. Flinn, Comment, Personalizing 
Informed Consent: The Challenge of Health Literacy, 2 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 379–94 
(2009) (recognizing the low “health literacy” of millions of Americans and adoption of the “reasonable 
patient” standard as the scope of a physician’s duty to inform in order to combat it). 
191 See supra note 48 and accompanying text (listing the courts that have accepted the Feldman-
Kearl case-by-case approach to allowing prescription drug design defect liability claims). 
192 See Freeman v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 618 N.W.2d 827, 833–42 (Neb. 2000) (adopting a 
case-by-case application of comment k as an affirmative defense to a plaintiff’s design defect claim for 
prescription drugs). 
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focusing on traditional tort law goals—deterrence and compensation—
misses altogether broader aspects of drug safety in the healthcare system.  
A normal design defect challenge to a drug’s design suggests that a drug 
(like any other type of product) could and should have been designed more 
safely some other way.193  Apart from the important fact that most dangers 
in a drug are unavoidable attributes of the very chemicals that promote its 
cures,194 design defect claims discourage manufacturers from developing 
and marketing new drugs that would provide new approaches to conditions 
for which another drug already may exist.  This disincentive exists because 
conventional cost-benefit theory for design defectiveness suggests that 
only one design can optimally achieve a health or other benefit when 
balanced against competing safety and other costs.195 
A look back at the earlier illustration involving three drugs for lung 
infections, each with differing side-effects,196 illuminates this problem.  It 
will be recalled that although each of these separate drugs for the same 
condition caused side-effects in some people, each provided effective 
treatment for others, so that each such drug was reasonably “designed.”  
Yet, if drug design defect litigation were generally allowed, once the first 
such drug was marketed, other drug manufacturers would have little 
incentive to spend the half billion dollars or so required to develop and 
market a new lung infection drug.197  Consumer (and physician) choice 
would be materially enhanced if the other two drugs became available, but 
manufacturers would be gambling large to develop them at all, for it often 
is difficult to predict which among two or more drugs aimed at the same 
malady lay jurors ultimately may conclude has the best ratio of benefits to 
risks. 
Thus, a robust design-defect litigation process would tend to drive all 
drugs competing for the treatment of each particular ailment, but one, from 
the market, notwithstanding the fact that a variety of drugs—each with 
slightly differing side-effects and benefits for different people—may enrich 
the pharmacopeia available to a population comprised of many millions of 
very different people.  As for protecting the public from improperly 
designed drugs, the combination of vigorous FDA oversight, warning 
claims against manufacturers, and market incentives (consider the costs to 
                                                                                                                          
193 See Conk, True Test, supra note 14, at 738–39 (criticizing the exclusion of prescription drugs 
from the “general measure of product design defect—the reasonable alternative design test”); Conk, 
Design Defect, supra note 14, at 1089 (stating that the Restatement (Third) of Torts’s exemption of 
medical devices from the alternative-safer-design standard “reverses thirty-five years of safety-
advancing products-liability law”). 
194 See supra Part III.A. 
195 See OWEN, supra note 14, § 8.5. 
196 See supra Part III.B. 
197 See supra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the costs of bringing a new prescription 
drug to the market). 
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Merck of the Vioxx recall and imbroglio)198 seems preferable to scattered 
juries empanelled in boxes of twelve for resolving the baskets of complex 
policy questions involved in determining what kinds of drugs (with what 
kinds of benefits, risks, and warnings) properly should be on the market.  
The issue here is about choice; the lung infection illustration above shows 
how drug availability and, thus, choice are restricted by private litigation 
into the defectiveness of drug designs.  Banning drug design litigation 
altogether would remove this obstacle and thereby promote consumer 
choice. 
2.  Expand Duties to Warn 
If drug manufacturers are protected from design defect litigation, 
which they should be, then they should also be required to disseminate 
information widely and effectively about whatever dangers their drugs may 
contain.  Warnings of this type, of course, are vital to intelligent choice 
about the desirability of particular drugs.  Current principles on warning 
“adequacy” are suited to the substantive aspect of this task.199  But, as 
previously discussed, two limited-duty principles seriously obstruct the 
dissemination of warning information: liability shields protecting both drug 
manufacturers and pharmacists from providing warnings directly to 
patients.200  Both types of healthcare providers are protected by the learned 
intermediary principle and its premise that only doctors (and nurse 
practitioners) should communicate directly with patients about the costs 
and benefits of particular drugs.  Yet, manufacturers and pharmacists—not 
doctors—are the true experts on pharmaceuticals.201  Making useful 
information about prescription drugs available to patients, the ultimate 
consumers, is necessary to maximizing choice, since uninformed choice is 
no choice at all.202 
                                                                                                                          
198 See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text. 
199 This assumption is premised on the continued decline of the federal preemption doctrine as a 
bar to warning adequacy claims against drug manufacturers.  See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 
1191 (2009) (holding that prior FDA approval of a drug label did not bar an inadequate warning claim); 
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 24,693 (May 20, 
2009) (restraining agencies from secreting preemption rulings in preambles to federal regulations and 
from asserting the preemptive effect of federal law without sufficient justification); see also Mary J. 
Davis, The Battle over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1089, 
1089–94 (2007). 
200 See supra Parts IV.D–E. 
201 See The Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of American Report, in THE PURSUIT OF 
HIGH PERFORMANCE THROUGH RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: UNDERSTANDING PHARMACEUTICAL 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT COST DRIVERS 4–11 (2007), available at http://www.phrma.org/files/ 
Accenture%20R&D%20Report-2007.pdf (noting the vast amounts of time and money spent by 
pharmaceutical companies on research and development); supra note 162 and accompanying text 
(noting the extensive training pharmacists receive in all aspects of drug therapy compared to the 
cursory training doctors receive). 
202 Owen, Figuring Foreseeability, supra note 79, at 1281–82. 
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To enhance choice, therefore, private law should abolish the learned 
intermediary rule.  So doing would provide both manufacturers and 
pharmacists with duties to communicate useful cost-benefit information 
about drug dangers—effective, not vague boilerplate warnings—to 
consumers.  Doctors (often, together with their health-education delegates) 
would retain their vital, professional duty to link appropriate drugs to 
appropriate patients, but drug manufacturers no longer would be allowed to 
entice consumers with television commercials—depicting happy and 
healthy people dancing in fields of flowers—only to shield themselves 
from a responsibility to warn behind the doctor’s white coat.  And 
pharmacists would also be required to share their very substantial 
pharmacological expertise with the people they directly serve—a 
responsibility that this noble profession, marginalized so long by the 
learned intermediary doctrine, might enthusiastically embrace.  Ultimately, 
abolishing the learned intermediary rule should increase the amount of 
information on drug dangers provided to consumers, improving their 
opportunity for an intelligent, final say on what types of dangerous 
pharmaceuticals, if any, they choose to consume.203 
B.  Quality 
In a truly liberal democracy, quality health care means the 
individualized health care chosen by each citizen, so that the very idea of 
quality, at a fundamental level, merges into choice.  But there are also 
objective aspects to quality health care relevant to the private law 
prescription drug issues examined here.  First, banning drug design 
litigation should increase the availability of drugs, as discussed above, 
thereby providing doctors (with patient input) with greater opportunities to 
make better matches of particular drugs to particular patients.204  Drug 
therapy, therefore, should be improved by this change in private law. 
The proposal to broaden duties to warn should also improve the quality 
of health care.205  As manufacturers and pharmacists fulfill their new duties 
to provide consumers with effective information about various drug 
choices, informed consumers will be better positioned to help doctors 
decide, initially, which (if any) drugs are best suited to their particular 
conditions and constitutions.  Moreover, once patients begin to take 
particular drugs, they will be better informed (by manufacturers, doctors, 
                                                                                                                          
203 Another important reform to private drug law, albeit outside the scope of this Article, is to lift 
some preemption restrictions to products liability actions imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court over the 
last couple of decades.  See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs’ Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348 (2001) 
(prohibiting state law actions for fraud-on-the-FDA).  President Obama recently reversed the Bush 
administration’s similarly restrictive preemption policies.  See Memorandum for the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies, supra note 199. 
204 See supra Part V.A.1. 
205 See supra Part V.A.2. 
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and pharmacists) on what warning signals to watch out for with respect to 
particular side-effects, allowing them to seek ameliorative care sooner than 
otherwise would be the case.  Harm caused by drug side-effects should 
therefore be reduced. 
C.  Cost 
While choice and quality of health care are both quite likely to 
improve from the proposed reforms, it is more difficult to predict the net 
effects of such reforms on costs and cost containment in the healthcare 
system.  Surely some costs will increase.  First, if design litigation is 
banned, manufacturers should make larger investments in developing, 
manufacturing, and marketing new drugs, as previously postulated.206  Yet, 
one might reasonably assume that manufacturers will assure that the 
benefits of drugs in which they invest will exceed their costs.  Indeed, 
without the constant threat of unpredictable drug design litigation, the 
accuracy of a manufacturer’s cost-benefit analyses of its drugs should be 
improved.  In addition, increasing the warning responsibilities of 
manufacturers and pharmacists, and indirectly of doctors (who will have to 
spend more time answering questions posed by better-informed patients), 
will generate various direct information costs, and a surfeit of available 
information may result in “warnings pollution,” which has costs of its 
own.207 
Despite these cost increases, the reforms proposed here should 
decrease various other costs of the healthcare system.  First, improvements 
in the quality of health care discussed above should enhance the health of 
the citizenry and thus lower the costs of health care overall.208  For 
example, improving drug therapy by expanding the duties to warn should 
alleviate some conditions that otherwise would require more expensive 
surgical intervention.  Moreover, fully informed patients should be less 
likely to agree to unnecessary drug treatments that some doctors may 
prescribe defensively to guard against malpractice litigation, since patients 
should not want to expose themselves to disclosed drug dangers unless 
they have reason to believe that the benefits of the proposed drug therapy 
outweigh the risks. 
Other cost decreases may result from structural changes in how health 
information is delivered, changes that may be prompted by the proposals 
offered here.  Presently, doctors and nurse practitioners are the only parties 
charged with providing information to patients, as previously discussed.209  
                                                                                                                          
206 Cf. supra notes 194–95 and accompanying text (explaining how design defect litigation 
discourages manufacturers from developing new drugs). 
207 See OWEN, supra note 14, § 9.3. 
208 See supra Part V. 
209 See supra Part IV.D. 
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Yet widening the duty to disseminate health information to manufacturers 
and pharmacists is likely to create a veritable revolution in how 
information is disseminated, as previously suggested.210  For example, 
patient counseling on drug dangers by expert pharmacists is plainly 
cheaper than by physicians, whose time is typically more expensive and 
often better spent on the direct provision of health care.  Another result of 
this information revolution may be to help doctors realize that they need to 
partner with professional health educators in healthcare delivery.  Today, 
doctors as a practical matter fail to fulfill their informed consent 
responsibilities to inform patients fully and meaningfully on the costs and 
benefits of a proposed drug or other treatment, including alternative 
treatments, or no treatment at all.211  Once healthcare consumers become 
routinely bombarded with information on the benefits and risks of various 
drug therapies by manufacturers and pharmacists (as well as by doctors), 
doctors may become overwhelmed with patient questions about the 
benefits and risks of drugs and alternative therapies.  In such an 
environment, it seems likely that many doctors will choose to delegate 
considerable responsibility for information dissemination to professional 
health educators, whose time is less expensive than that of physicians.  In 
this way, increased burdens from broader health information disclosure 
duties may prompt helpful structural changes in healthcare delivery that 
decrease the costs (and improve the quality) of information dissemination. 
The doctrine of comparative fault may appropriately generate another 
cost saving.  Once consumers become broadly informed of drug dangers 
under the reforms suggested here, they should be fully equipped to make 
intelligent decisions on their own drug therapies.  If, with all this 
information, they fail to participate meaningfully in initial drug therapy 
decisions, or if they later fail adequately to monitor their conditions during 
therapy, responsibility for a harmful result that a cautious patient would 
have avoided should logically fall on the shoulders of the passively 
imprudent patient.212  The careless patient in this scenario would 
appropriately be deprived of some or all legal relief against the drug 
manufacturer, the doctor, or the pharmacist, which would effectively 
remove these costs from the healthcare system. 
                                                                                                                          
210 See id. 
211 See Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 
313, 313–17 (2002) (describing current practices relating to informed consent as “a charade, a symbolic 
but contentless formality”); Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 900–06 
(1994) (examining the ineffectiveness of informed consent to health care and recommending its 
contextualized application). 
212 Although the patient’s worsened condition may generate additional healthcare needs, 
presumably this outcome would have been the same under the current private law regime. 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Structural proposals for reforming the healthcare system presently at 
large appear to overlook important ways in which private law affects the 
system.  Current law on responsibility for dangers from prescription drugs 
is antiquated by its narrow obsession with classic tort law goals to the 
exclusion of the broader needs of the healthcare system.  It is here 
proposed to reform current law by banning design defect litigation against 
manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, and by abolishing the learned 
intermediary doctrine, the latter of which would impose full-bodied duties 
to warn consumers on both manufacturers and pharmacists.  Consistent 
with traditional principles of private drug law, these reforms appear to 
promote central goals of healthcare reform—maximizing consumer choice, 
increasing quality, and reducing costs of health care in America.  Each of 
these reform proposals is bold, yet the current healthcare crisis in this 
nation demands bold solutions.  Private law should be flexible enough, 
perhaps with some legislative help, to shift its focus to provide appropriate 
incentives to drug companies, pharmacists, and patients to partner together 
to minimize harm from and maximize the benefits of the vast 
pharmacopeia of drugs. 
